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ABSTRACT
Over a decade ago, Prof. Mark Bauer wrote an article exploring the
antitrust implications of a small college’s decision to forbid fraternities
from competing in the student housing market and the ensuing litigation.
Expanding this line of research, several key holdings—despite contrary
antitrust doctrine elsewhere—have granted universities broad authority to
control the residential choices of their students qua consumers, bespeaking
a unique relationship between university and student to which the fraternity
is an interloper. These core cases casually allude to the ostensibly defunct
doctrine of in loco parentis, under which colleges were once seen as proxy
parents to their pupils, implying that in housing matters the paradigm of
the custodial university retains the force to overcome competitive concerns.
Given both costs and benefits to that view, this Article calls for more
judicial scrutiny of the relations amongst colleges, students, and
fraternities.
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[A]t various times for various reasons, fraternities have stood directly in
the way of college efforts to define and refine residential living. For that
reason, small colleges have often taken action to weaken the influence of
fraternities. The colleges that have actually eliminated fraternities are
those that believe that they can fully control their environment.
In that respect, colleges are no different than any other monopolist; they
are simply trying to control their environment and anyone or anything that
gets in their way.1

INTRODUCTION
Universities2 and their fraternities3 have always made strange
bedfellows.4 In their origins, college fraternities were conceived as secret
societies precisely because faculties saw their institution as direct threats to
academic prerogatives and generally suppressed them vigorously.5 As time
passed, however, colleges came to depend heavily upon emerging
fraternities to house their students and began to consider them as vital
adjuncts
to
the
collegiate
experience.6
But
of
late,
universities—particularly private colleges in New England—have once

1. Mark D. Bauer, Small Liberal Arts Colleges, Fraternities, and Antitrust: Rethinking
Hamilton College, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 347, 411 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
2. “University” and “college” are used interchangeably to refer to institutes of higher
education. E.g., Mark D. Bauer, Freedom of Association for College Fraternities After
Christian Legal Society and Citizens United, 39 J.C. & U.L. 247, 248 n.1 (2013); Note,
Mandatory Housing Requirements: The Constitutionality of Parietal Rules, 60 IOWA L. REV.
992, 992 n.3 (1975) [hereinafter Mandatory Housing Requirements].
3. For the sake of concision, this Article uses “fraternity” and “fraternal” throughout to
refer to both men’s and women’s fraternal organizations. E.g., Jared S. Sunshine, The
Fraternity as Franchise: A Conceptual Framework, 42 J.C. & U.L. 375, 376 n.2 (2016)
[hereinafter Sunshine, Fraternity as Franchise]; Jared S. Sunshine, A Lazarus Taxon in
South Carolina: A Natural History of National Fraternities’ Respondeat Superior Liability
for Hazing, 5 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 79, 79 n.4 (2014) [hereinafter Sunshine, Lazarus Taxon];
Bauer, supra note 2, at 248 n.2; Bauer, supra note 1, at 347 n.1; Shane Kimzey, Note, The
Role of Insurance in Fraternity Litigation, 16 REV. LITIG. 459, 460 n.2 (1997); Eric A.
Paine, Recent Trends in Fraternity-Related Liability, 23 J.L. & EDUC. 191, 191 n.1 (1994);
Susan J. Curry, Note, Hazing and the “Rush” Toward Reform: Responses from Universities,
Fraternities, State Legislatures, and the Courts, 16 J.C. & U.L. 93, 93 n.1 (1989); see C.
Sidney Neuhoff, Note, The Legal Status of Fraternities, 11 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 30, 30 (1925)
(“No distinction is made in the cases between fraternities and sororities. The word
‘fraternity,’ in its generic sense includes organizations of either or both sexes.”).
4. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 2, 1.39 (The Floating Press
2008) (1623).
5. See infra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 27–31 and accompanying text.
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again asserted their purported supervisory rights more robustly to severely
curtail or even eradicate Greek7 life from campus.8
Much scholarly literature has emerged on the often-fraught
relationships between civic municipalities and the universities that
dominate their social and economic livelihood: so-called town-gown
relations,9 named after the academic gown once characteristic of the
scholarly set.10 On issues from property to violent affrays to civil authority,
city councilors and university deans have clashed over the priorities and
prerogatives of students and residents for centuries.11 But what of the even
more fraught relationship between Greek and gown?12 If relations between
a city and its local college are complicated by intertwined interests, a
fraternity captive to, but distinctively differentiated from, university
overseers presents yet more difficult problems.13

7. Although some might object to “Greek” as an overly informal reference to
fraternity issues, scholarship is replete with its use and its monosyllabic brevity has much to
recommend it. E.g., Dara Aquila Govan, Note, “Hazing Out” the Membership Intake
Process in Sororities and Fraternities: Preserving the Integrity of the Pledge Process
Versus Addressing Hazing Liability, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 679, 681 (2001); Gregory E.
Rutledge, Hell Night Hath No Fury Like a Pledge Scorned . . . and Injured: Hazing
Litigation in U.S. Colleges and Universities, 25 J.C. & U.L. 361, 362–63 (1998).
8. See Bauer, supra note 1; Zach Schonfeld, Inside the Colleges That Killed Frats for
Good, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 10, 2014, 12:24 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/inside-collegeskilled-frats-good-231346 [https://perma.cc/8GNH-HEMJ] (discussing eradication of Greek
life at Middlebury College, Colby College, Bowdoin College, and Williams College);
Michael W. Gosk, Comment, From Animal House to No House: Legal Rights of the Banned
Fraternity, 28 CONN. L. REV. 167, 168 (1995) (discussing restrictions and bans placed on
Bowdoin, Dickinson, Middlebury, Trinity, Colby, Amherst, and Franklin & Marshall); infra
note 255 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., TOWN AND GOWN RELATIONS: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES (Roger L.
Kemp ed. 2013); Stephen D. Bruning, Shea McGrew & Mark Cooper, Town–Gown
Relationships: Exploring University-Community Engagement from the Perspective of
Community Members, 32 PUB. REL. REV. 125 (2006); Loomis Mayfield, Town and Gown in
America: Some Historical and Institutional Issues of the Engaged University, 14 EDUC. FOR
HEALTH 231 (2001); Laurence Brockliss, Gown and Town: The University and the City in
Europe, 1200-2000, 38 MINERVA 147 (2000).
10. See Mayfield, supra note 9, at 237.
11. See Alexandra Shepard, Contesting Communities? ‘Town’ and ‘Gown’ in
Cambridge, c.1560-1640, in COMMUNITIES IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 216 (Alexandra
Shepard & Phil Withington eds., 2000).
12. Lacking the opportunity for rhyming portmanteau, alliteration must needs suffice.
13. See, e.g., Curry, supra note 3, at 93 (“The relationship between fraternities and
institutions of higher education has spawned a series of complex legal issues, ranging from
zoning disputes to fraternity bannings.” (footnotes omitted)); Sunshine, Fraternity as
Franchise, supra note 3, at 376–77 & nn.4–6.
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Well over a decade ago, Professor Mark D. Bauer penned an article
about a seemingly small case in upstate New York, Hamilton Chapter of
Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton College,14 in which a fraternity protested
its expulsion from campus based on antitrust theory.15 The essay, Small
Liberal Arts Colleges, Fraternities, and Antitrust: Rethinking Hamilton
College, traced the history of Greek-gown relations and then turned to the
perplexingly uniform phenomenon of antagonism towards fraternities in
small New England liberal arts colleges.16 Using Hamilton College as a
lens, Bauer was able to pinpoint the sources of conflict and validate the
persuasive arguments made by plaintiffs that the college’s actions were
highly suspect at best under antitrust law.17 Although ostensibly rooted in a
single case and the rather esoteric niche of collegiate residential housing
markets, Bauer’s discussion raised provocative questions regarding the
power of universities qua competitors in a commercial market.18
This Article seeks to draw on legal precedent to situate and analyze
the frequent antagonism that colleges have displayed toward their captive
fraternities.19 Part I offers the briefest of summaries of the synergetic
evolution of early universities and fraternities and traces the structural
changes over time that have led to today’s collegiate market for services
and sometimes virulently anti-Greek sentiment. In light of this evolution,
Part II revisits some of the questions raised in Bauer’s Rethinking Hamilton
College: to what extent are universities and their fraternities in competition,
and what does antitrust precedent have to contribute? Given more recent
developments on campus, in legal scholarship, and in judicial opinion,
Bauer’s prescriptions regarding antitrust analysis seem all the more
prescient. Part III focuses on a differentiating factor mentioned in the
Greek-gown antitrust cases: the sui generis role of the university in
overseeing its students, variously referred to as parietal rights or in loco
parentis, casting the college as a proxy parent to its students. In
conclusion, Part IV asks whether the frequent rivalry between fraternities
14. Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59 (2d Cir.
1997).
15. Bauer, supra note 1; see Robert E. Manley, Antitrust Implications of Fraternity
Mistreatment by Colleges, FRATERNAL L., Nov. 2004, at 1, 1–2 (discussing Bauer’s article).
16. Bauer, supra note 1, at 351–58; see also Schonfeld, supra note 8 (discussing several
other liberal arts colleges’ antagonism).
17. Bauer, supra note 1, at 368–410.
18. Bauer, supra note 1, at 410–12; see also Jeffrey C. Sun & Philip T.K. Daniel, The
Sherman Act Antitrust Provisions and Collegiate Action: Should There Be a Continued
Exception for the Business of the University?, 25 J.C. & U.L. 451, 493–95 (1999).
19. Besides the considerable debt owed to Professor Bauer, this Article also serves to
follow up on some of the questions about colleges and competition law raised previously by
this author elsewhere. See Sunshine, Fraternity as Franchise, supra note 3, at 405–06.
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and their host institutions is as inevitable as it sometimes seems, given the
long-standing and unique relationships amongst them and the student body.
This last issue is the animating force of this Article. Bauer’s canny
identification of the antitrust regime as an analytical framework provides
legal grounding, but the underlying challenge is explaining the persistent
animus between many colleges and chapters. Commercial competition
between the two provides one explanation, but the unique relationship of
the university and its students must also be a factor: a relationship to which
the fraternity is an interloper. Although courts have ostensibly rejected
colleges’ onetime dictatorial power over their students, appearances
suggest such tendencies are philosophically alive and well at some small
liberal arts colleges, if not also at larger institutions. As with many
multigenerational feuds, resolving age-old differences between hoary
institutions like universities and fraternities will not be easy. Antitrust
precedent, perhaps, provides a distinctive and unexpected perspective in
considering whether a lasting détente will ever prove possible.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF GREEK-GOWN RELATIONS

Fraternalism has been a uniquely North American institution, at least
for most of its history; many authors have catalogued it well.20 From the
start, however, fraternities and the universities at which they arose found
themselves fiercely at odds.21 Faculties demanded the eradication of any
secret society, the taking of oaths abjuring membership, and the expulsion
of any student persisting in association.22 The reasoning was generally that
such societies split the atom of student loyalty, preventing the faculty from
exercising proper discipline over their charges, particularly in the
regimented era of academia preceding the Civil War.23 Those early
20. The doyen of fraternal historians will always remain the author of the eponymous
manual, see WM. RAIMOND BAIRD, BAIRD’S MANUAL OF AMERICAN COLLEGE FRATERNITIES
(6th ed. 1905), but many others have followed in his footsteps, not the least of which is
Bauer himself. See Bauer, supra note 1, at 351–58; see also NICHOLAS L. SYRETT, THE
COMPANY HE KEEPS: A HISTORY OF WHITE COLLEGE FRATERNITIES (2009).
21. See SYRETT, supra note 20, at 35–37; JOHN S. BRUBACHER & WILLIS RUDY, HIGHER
EDUCATION IN TRANSITION 127 (Transaction Publishers 4th ed. 1997) (1958) (“The rise of
fraternities did not come without strife. On many campuses, both faculty and students were
bitterly opposed to them . . . .”).
22. E.g., People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton Coll., 40 Ill. 186, 186 (1866); see SYRETT,
supra note 20, at 35–37; BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 21, at 127.
23. See Wheaton Coll., 40 Ill. at 187 (explaining faculty rationale for challenging
societies); SYRETT, supra note 20, at 15–16 (discussing the regimented schedule of pre-Civil
War college students); Bauer, supra note 1, at 351 (discussing the regimented nature of
universities).
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colleges typically regulated their charges minutely, including the
employment of corporal punishment.24 Such scrutiny and hostility made it
expedient, indeed vital, for early fraternities to function under the strictest
secrecy, as any breach thereof risked annihilation.25
Antagonism began to ebb in part because of the necessities of housing.
The earliest colleges had provided housing for their small student
populations, but burgeoning universities now found it increasingly difficult
to accommodate students economically, leading them to relax residency
rules.26 Fraternities, once largely social groups, were able to come out of
the shadows to provide room and board.27 Indeed, rivalries quickly sprang
up between societies vying for what amounted to lucrative business
opportunities to secure a lessee for a long-term contract.28 Such
competition gave rise to a residential arms race: ever more ornate and
commodious chapterhouses, the better to lure students qua consumers to
their doors.29 Universities acquiesced in or even encouraged this
development, as the magnificence of such residences reflected admirably
on colleges as well as fraternities and attracted better applicants without

24. Brian Jackson, Note, The Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis: An Historical
Survey and Proposal for Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1135, 1140 & n.30 (1991). See also
SYRETT, supra note 20, at 15–17.
25. See Bauer, supra note 1, at 352; SYRETT, supra note 20, at 36–37; BRUBACHER &
RUDY, supra note 21, at 127 (“In many places, the fraternity movement was driven
underground, but it was by no means extirpated completely. The attempts by college
faculties to wipe out fraternities ultimately failed because it was impossible to achieve a
common front on this matter.”).
26. See BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 21, at 121–22 (“[Colleges] found themselves
without the funds to provide dormitory facilities for their constantly enlarging enrollment. It
was all they could do to find enough money for instruction, salaries, and classroom
buildings. Thus the dormitory system fell into disuse for financial as well as ideological
reasons.”).
27. BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 21, at 122, 128; Bauer, supra note 1, at 355; see
also 3 THOMAS D. CLARK, INDIANA UNIVERSITY: MIDWESTERN PIONEER 239–40 (1977)
(“Historically, Greek letter fraternities had been a part of Indiana University since 1845. In
earlier years the organizations had made material contributions in solving a part of the
student housing problems.”); Anne Willson Bartels, Anti Fraternity Agitation, 51 ANCHORA
DELTA GAMMA, 1934, at 22, 25; H.I. Brock, Reappraising the College Fraternity, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 1933, at 9 (“[I]t was noted that the fraternities had served a useful purpose
for many years by taking over the job of housing and feeding undergraduates which the
university had neglected to assume.”), reprinted in 21 RATTLE THETA CHI, Feb. 1933, at 7;
BAIRD, supra note 20, at 32–33.
28. See, e.g., BAIRD, supra note 20, at 32–33 (describing the trend towards “senseless
rivalry” amongst fraternities in the construction of ever more expensive housing); SYRETT,
supra note 20, at 163–64.
29. BAIRD, supra note 20, at 32–33.
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costing the college a dime.30 Fraternal assets accordingly grew rapidly: in
1905, the value of fraternities’ residential property was estimated within $3
million;31 by 1920, it had risen to over $17 million, and by 1927, $64
million.32
Yet doubts about the salutary influence of fraternities persisted,
particularly among faculties. Following World War II, colleges began to
focus more firmly on programs constructing dormitories under their own
control, which naturally brought them into competition with the very
institutions they had once fostered to address their deficiencies.33
Mandatory residency requirements were often reasserted to finance this
construction.34 Moreover, perceptions of student-body moral dissolution in
the post-war era often settled on the more tangible targets fraternities
provided, leading universities and society at large to view Greek life as a
threat to student scruples.35 And, of course, housing was increasingly a big
business, and colleges no less than any other enterprise are always seeking
new revenue streams to fund their operations.36 As the twentieth century
progressed towards its end, a notable minority of colleges began to
promulgate policies that severely restricted or banned fraternities.37 Often,
these interdictions were pronounced for the express purpose of
monopolizing student housing under the college’s control.38

30. See Bauer, supra note 1, at 355–56; BAIRD, supra note 20, at 32–33 (“All of this has
resulted in direct benefit to the colleges, and the wiser among college officials are
encouraging the development of this feature of fraternity life in every way possible. The
advantages of the chapter-house system are not altogether on the side of the student. They
relieve the colleges from the necessity of increasing the dormitory accommodations . . . .”);
BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 21, at 129.
31. BAIRD, supra note 20, at 33.
32. BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 21, at 129; see also infra note 460 and
accompanying text (estimating modern value of fraternal property at $3 billion).
33. Bauer, supra note 1, at 356; Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note 2, at
994–95.
34. See Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note 2, at 995–96; Paul Jerald Ward,
Parietal Regulations and the University: Required Residence in Campus Dormitories, 5
HUM. RTS. 215, 231–34 (1976).
35. See LAURIE A. WILKIE, THE LOST BOYS OF ZETA PSI: A HISTORICAL ARCHAEOLOGY
OF MASCULINITY AT A UNIVERSITY FRATERNITY 231–34 (2010); Gosk, supra note 8, at 168–
69.
36. See Ward, supra note 34, at 231–34; Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note
2, at 995–96; infra notes 460–64 and accompanying text.
37. See Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note 2, at 997–99; Schonfeld, supra
note 8.
38. See Bauer, supra note 1, at 349–50; see also Mandatory Housing Requirements,
supra note 2, at 998–1000.
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Throughout the evolution of fraternities and universities, the lodestar
of Greek-gown relations has remained remarkably fixed: colleges have
been viewed as entitled by right to enforce absolute control over their
students and to allow external influences only at their sufferance.39 Thus,
while universities might have permitted fraternity operations in eras of
housing shortages,40 they remained putatively free to withdraw that consent
should their interests in student discipline so demand.41 It is revealing to
peruse the opinions of three different courts separated by half-century
intervals, each reviewing college interdictions of fraternities. First, from
the Illinois Supreme Court in 1866:
We perceive nothing unreasonable in the rule itself, since all persons
familiar with college life know that the tendency of secret societies is to
withdraw students from the control of the faculty, and impair to some
extent the discipline of the institution. Such may not always be their effect,
but such is their general tendency. But whether the rule be judicious or not,
it violates neither good morals nor the law of the land, and is therefore
clearly within the power of the college authorities to make and enforce.42

Next, from the United States Supreme Court in 1915:
It is said that the fraternity to which complainant belongs is a moral and
of itself a disciplinary force. This need not be denied. But whether such
membership makes against discipline was for the State of Mississippi to
determine. It is to be remembered that the University was established by
the State and is under the control of the State, and the enactment of the
statute may have been induced by the opinion that membership in the
prohibited societies divided the attention of the students and distracted from
that singleness of purpose which the State desired to exist in its public
educational institutions. It is not for us to entertain conjectures in
opposition to the views of the State and annul its regulations upon
disputable considerations of their wisdom or necessity.43

And finally, from a New York trial court in 1965:
The university must always be in a position to exercise sufficient
supervision over students and their social organizations to assure
compliance with university policies. So long as such organizations are
local in nature, the situation is manageable. But when they involve ties
outside the university over which the university can exercise no control,
serious conflicts may arise. This is something a university cannot tolerate.

39. See, e.g., infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Brock, supra note 27.
41. See, e.g., infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text; see also infra Sections II.B.1,
II.B.2, II.B.5, II.C.2.
42. People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton Coll., 40 Ill. 186, 187 (1866).
43. Waugh v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Miss., 237 U.S. 589, 596–97 (1915).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2017

9

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 2

68

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1

It cannot allow itself to be placed in the position of sanctioning student
social organizations which are governed by, and responsible to,
non-university authority.
The existence of national fraternities and sororities at a university
presents just such an anomaly.44

Is it not striking how similar these sentiments have remained over time?
The judiciary seems quite willing to accept that the very existence of
fraternities somehow detracts from the proper discipline and order that a
college and its faculty have the right to enforce at any cost. Another half
century after the last of these rulings, it is far from clear that a court today
would rule any differently.45 Whether modern antitrust law suggests
otherwise is the subject of the next Part.
II. ANTITRUST PRECEDENT AND THE COLLEGIATE RESIDENTIAL MARKET
At common law, anticompetitive action was generally limited to
practices that could be classified as such per se, such as overt
monopolization, price fixing, or agreements not to compete.46 This
sufficed well enough for the more provincial markets of the Victorian Era,
but the tremendous expansion of commercial scope during the Second
Industrial Revolution gave rise to new problems.47 In particular, groups of
American industrialists began to combine their interests into cooperative
trusts whose purpose was to corner an entire sector of the market, thus
allowing the trust to effectively set prices.48 Such compacts overwhelmed
the limited scope of the common law and were ultimately met with

44. Beta Sigma Rho, Inc. v. Moore, 261 N.Y.S.2d 658, 662 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965)
(quoting report entitled “The University and its Student Social Organizations,” prepared by
the President of the State University of New York in 1953, pursuant to an order from the
University’s Board of Trustees).
45. See, e.g., infra Section II.B.5 (discussing a 2007 case).
46. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 497 (1940) (“The common law
doctrines relating to contracts and combinations in restraint of trade were well understood
long before the enactment of the Sherman law. They were contracts for the restriction or
suppression of competition in the market, agreements to fix prices, divide marketing
territories, apportion customers, restrict production and the like practices, which tend to
raise prices or otherwise take from buyers or consumers the advantages which accrue to
them from free competition in the market.” (footnote omitted)); see KEITH N. HYLTON,
ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 35–37 (2003); Sun &
Daniel, supra note 18, at 453–54.
47. See 1 EARL W. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES, 8–15 (1978); HYLTON, supra note 46, at 38.
48. See HYLTON, supra note 46, at 37–40; KINTNER, supra note 47; Sun & Daniel,
supra note 18, at 453–54.
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legislation in the late 1800s49: the Sherman Antitrust Act, which contained
two provisions protecting vigorous competition that remain in force to this
day.50
The first prescribes that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal;”51 the
second that “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”52 Despite the
sweeping language, the courts quickly concluded that only unreasonable
restraints on trade were illegal, lest the most picayune (or procompetitive)
agreement give rise to liability.53 The provision against monopolization,
however, needed no such limiting gloss and has been rightly read broadly
to prevent oligopolies as well as strict monopolies—the concentration of
power in any market in too few hands.54
For alleged restraints of trade that resembled the early common law
infractions and were nigh invariably harmful—bid rigging, tying, price
fixing, and the like—the courts continued to follow what is aptly known as
the per se rule.55 This doctrine conserves judicial resources by declaring
that certain practices are automatically unreasonable and therefore illegal
under the Sherman Act, and can have no saving justification or
countervailing benefit.56
Given that companies are wary of such
transparent illegality, however, many antitrust cases involve more nuanced
theories of how the defendants’ conduct frustrates free competition.57
49. See KINTNER, supra note 47; HYLTON, supra note 46, at 37–40; William L. Letwin,
Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 235 (1956);
Sun & Daniel, supra note 18, at 453–55.
50. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012).
51. Id. § 1.
52. Id. § 2.
53. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911); Bd. of
Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
54. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946).
55. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958) (citing United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210 (1940); United States v. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co., 85 F. 271, aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Fashion Originators’ Guild v. Federal
Trade Comm’n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947))
(tying); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 283–84 (bid rigging), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211
(1899).
56. E.g., N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5; United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265,
282–83 (1942).
57. E.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 332–34 (1990).
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These more difficult cases are analyzed under the “rule of reason,” which
asks whether the demonstrated anticompetitive aspects of the conduct at
issue are outweighed by procompetitive aspects, considering all the
circumstances.58 As the name suggests, the answer reflects whether the
conduct is reasonable or not.59
Similarly, to intelligibly accuse someone of monopolizing “any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States,” a discernible part—a
relevant product and geographic market—must be pled.60 The courts have
settled on the criterion of substitutability to define this relevant market,61
generally setting its boundaries to include those products that a consumer
would view as reasonably interchangeable given a small but significant
non-transitory increase in price in one, because only such products are truly
in competition with one another.62 For example, the Supreme Court found
that many flexible wrapping materials were interchangeable, and thus one
company’s supremacy in cellophane manufacture could not give rise to
liability, as it had only a small share of the properly defined market for all
wrapping materials.63 By contrast, a district court enjoined a merger
between sellers of loose leaf tobacco after finding that other tobacco
products would not be viewed by consumers as substitutable in the event of
monopolistic price increases in loose leaf.64 This emphasizes the point that
to improperly dominate the relevant market, the alleged monopolist must
be able to exert market power, viz., to profitably set prices above those
which would be imposed by healthy competition.65
58. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 238. There is arguably a third standard,
known as “quick look” review under the rule of reason, which seeks to gain the efficiencies
of expeditious review without imposing the onerous automatic liability of the per se rule.
See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100–04 (1984).
59. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911); Bd. of Trade of
Chi., 246 U.S. at 238–39.
60. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 173
n.1 (1965) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) (amended 1974)); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 268–69 (2d Cir. 1979).
61. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
62. See id.; United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 396–404
(1956); Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 438 (3d Cir. 1997);
see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §
4.1 (2010).
63. E.I. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 403–04. This classic antitrust holding, widely known as
the “Cellophane Case,” has garnered much criticism, beginning nearly immediately after its
announcement. E.g., Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70
HARV. L. REV. 281 (1956).
64. FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 173 (D.D.C. 2000).
65. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27 n.46 (1984); George A.
Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 807, 812–13 (1992).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol39/iss1/2

12

Sunshine: Antitrust Precedent & Anti-Fraternity Sentiment: Revisiting Hamil

2017]

REVISITING HAMILTON COLLEGE

71

A. The College in Commerce: Competition Law on Campus
Foundationally, the Sherman Act addresses only commercial
conduct.66
This seemingly tautological requirement is relevant to
universities because, for much of their existence, their role was viewed as
scholastic and insusceptible to economic concerns such as restraint of
trade.67 Ironically, despite enormous trusts inuring to their benefit,68
colleges went effectively untouched by antitrust law.69 This began to
change with the Supreme Court’s 1975 recognition in Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar70 that when they engaged in commercial behavior, non-profit
organizations were just as susceptible to antitrust law as their for-profit
counterparts.71 Concurrently, courts were increasingly concluding that the
modern university often acts as a business rather than a cloistered ivory
tower.72 Nowadays, only when the university is acting as non-profit
educator rather than commercial competitor might anticompetitive
activities be exempted from scrutiny.73
Most obviously, colleges compete strenuously with one another to
attract and enroll students because those students are their core
consumers.74 Thus when a council of colleges agreed to regulate financial
aid grants and concomitant tuitions that colleges would offer to their
applicants, a district court concluded their actions amounted to nothing
66. E.g., Missouri v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980)
(holding economic boycott undertaken as an act of political expression was non-commercial
in nature and thus not subject to the Sherman Act); see Sun & Daniel, supra note 18, at 451.
67. See Sun & Daniel, supra note 18, at 452; DEREK BOK, BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER:
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MODERN UNIVERSITY 2–5 (1982).
68. See, e.g., James B. Stewart, In College Endowment Returns, Davids Beat the
Goliaths, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/business/incollege-endowment-returns-davids-beat-the-goliaths.html [https://perma.cc/RBH6-CWPU].
69. See Sun & Daniel, supra note 18, at 451.
70. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
71. Id. at 787 (citing United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485,
489 (1950)); see Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 694–96 (1978);
FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986).
72. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 111 (1984);
Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1997)
(“The case law thus recognizes that institutions of higher learning engage in a wide
spectrum of conduct, ranging from the distinctly noncommercial to the purely
proprietary.”); infra notes 74, 79 and accompanying text.
73. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 787; Selman v. Harvard Med. Sch., 494 F. Supp. 603,
620–21 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); compare NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100 n.22 (discussing the licensing of
college sports on television within scope of the Sherman Act), with Marjorie Webster Junior
Coll., Inc. v. Middle States Ass’n of Colls. and Secondary Schs., Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (discussing the accreditation of schools not commercial in nature).
74. See, e.g., infra Sections II.B.2, II.B.4, II.B.5.
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more than a conspiracy to fix prices in violation of the Sherman Act, in
United States v. Brown University.75 On appeal, the Third Circuit was
persuaded that the situation of colleges was sufficiently complex to demand
a full rule of reason analysis and remanded the case for that review in the
first instance.76 But the appellate court left scant doubt of its leanings:
financial aid was not charity but rather “part and parcel of the process of
setting tuition and thus a commercial transaction.”77 The court made short
work of the colleges’ arguments to the contrary, finding that the avowed
purpose of the council was “to eliminate price competition for talented
students among member institutions,” whilst expressing some skepticism as
to MIT’s arguments about the countervailing social goods occasioned by
such “a price fixing mechanism.”78 Ultimately, Congress was obliged to
pass a temporary amendment to the Sherman Act to allow universities to
collaborate in issuing need-blind financial aid.79
Similarly, when educational institutions operate stores selling goods
such as books to its students, they are engaging in commercial behavior and
cannot escape scrutiny. In Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple University,80 the
Third Circuit found that a college bookstore was capable of engaging in
predatory pricing: that is, temporarily setting prices below costs to drive
rivals out of business and thus monopolize the market.81 The fact that book
sales may be tangentially related to an educational mission was not an
issue, given that the sale of “textbook titles used each semester in Temple’s
undergraduate and graduate courses . . . [along with] clothing, gifts,
greeting cards, newspapers, magazines, and other publications of general
interest” placed the university in direct competition with generic
booksellers.82 Rather, the court’s analysis focused on the microeconomics
of whether the university’s pricing was merely discounted or actually
predatory, ultimately remanding to the trial court for that determination.83
Finally, state schools are generally exempt from antitrust scrutiny
under what has come to be called Parker immunity, after the leading case,
75. United States v. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1992), rev’d, 5 F.3d
658 (3d Cir. 1993).
76. Id. at 670–72, 678.
77. Id. at 668.
78. Id. at 673–75.
79. Application of Antitrust Laws to Award of Need-Based Educational Aid, Pub. L.
No. 103-382, § 568(a)-(d), 108 Stat. 4060 (1994); see Sun & Daniel, supra note 18, at
491–92.
80. Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple Univ., 697 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1982).
81. Id. at 91.
82. See id. at 91–92.
83. Id. at 92–93.
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Parker v. Brown.84 There, the Court held that when a state enacts a clear
policy of anticompetitive restraint, the Sherman Act will not curtail its
enactment.85 As discussed already, a private college might be held liable
for engaging in pricing conduct that steers students to its own bookstore
instead of a competitor.86 A public institution, however, cannot: in Cowboy
Book v. Board of Regents for Agricultural & Mechanical Colleges ex rel.
Oklahoma State University of Agriculture & Applied Science,87 a federal
court allowed Oklahoma State University to subsidize purchases at its own
proprietary bookstore, viewing the measures as financial aid to students
within the ambit of protected state action.88 No less than any other arm of
state government, public schools enjoy antitrust immunity.
B. Rivals for Residential Students: Revisiting Hamilton College
In so holding, the Cowboy Book court offered an observation that
leads naturally to Hamilton College and its siblings, concerning the
residential life of the student population:
Extension of credit to students for rental of dormitory rooms could well be
attacked by rental businesses in the university town. Along the same lines,
extensions of credit for room and board costs may include payments for
food prepared in the school cafeteria. These extensions of credit could be
subject to attack by local restaurants and fast food businesses.89

Such concerns had been touched on four years earlier in American
National Bank & Trust Company of Chicago v. Board of Regents for
Regency Universities.90 A state school, Northern Illinois University,
required that freshmen under the age of twenty-one reside in university
residence halls so long as space was available.91 The owner of a private
rental dormitory sued under the antitrust laws, claiming that even when
space was unavailable, the university assigned freshmen to temporary
housing and kept them there “until so shortly before the commencement of
the school year as to preclude plaintiffs from a realistic entry into the
market,” thus monopolizing the collegiate housing market.92 The court,
84. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
85. Id. at 350–52.
86. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
87. Cowboy Book, Ltd. v. Bd. of Regents for Agric. & Mech. Colls. ex rel. Okla. State
Univ. of Agric. & Applied Sci., 728 F. Supp. 1518 (W.D. Okla. 1989).
88. Id. at 1523.
89. Id.
90. Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi. v. Bd. of Regents for Regency Univs., 607 F.
Supp. 845 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
91. Id. at 846.
92. Id. at 846–47 (quoting the plaintiff’s memorandum).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2017

15

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 2

74

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1

however, easily found that the university’s rule on freshman residency was
state policy and would be immune under Parker.93
The plaintiff, however, had cleverly argued that the university was
violating its own policy for the purpose of shutting out competitors and
cornering student fees, even when it had no dormitory space left to offer
students.94 As the court had emphasized in Brown, the intent of the college
is germane to evaluating the competitive character of its conduct: a school
acting for pecuniary motivations may be liable whilst one following a
genuine academic policy is exempted.95 The court in American National
Bank could not assess on the record presented whether the college’s goal
was to reinforce its residential program or to eke out fees for non-existent
rooms, and thus the court declined to dismiss and allowed for further
discovery.96 Shortly thereafter, the parties settled.97
The residential requirement promulgated by Northern Illinois was a
species of what are called parietal rules. Such rules typically oblige some
subset (or indeed, the entirety) of a collegiate population to reside under
certain conditions and follow certain policies; typically the conditions
involve on-campus dormitory housing, and the policies, at least
traditionally, concern visitation hours and fraternization between male and
female students.98
These rules cannot be readily challenged as
anticompetitive when they form the pedagogical program of a state school
under Parker antitrust immunity.99 The central question raised by Bauer is
whether a private university can promulgate rules regarding residency that
have the intended consequence of ousting competing residential services,
such as those offered by fraternities, from the market.100 As Bauer
concluded, the answer would seem to be in the negative based on antitrust
principles,101 but the actual cases—both in Hamilton College and
subsequently—contort themselves ingeniously to avoid reaching that
result.102

93. Id. at 850.
94. Id. at 850–51.
95. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 667, 672–73 (3d Cir. 1993).
96. Am. Nat’l Bank, 607 F. Supp. at 851.
97. See Sun & Daniel, supra note 18, at 494 n.366.
98. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 34; Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note 2;
infra Part III.
99. See Am. Nat’l Bank, 607 F. Supp. at 850.
100. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 1; Manley, supra note 15, at 2.
101. See Bauer, supra note 1, at 410–12.
102. See infra Sections II.B.2, II.B.4, II.B.5.
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Mu Theta of Tau Kappa Epsilon v. Lycoming College

If Hamilton College is a relatively small case,103 then Mu Theta of Tau
Kappa Epsilon v. Lycoming College104 must be called a minuscule one,
occupying only three pages of the Pennsylvania reporter.
Lycoming
College is a small liberal arts institution in rural Williamsport,
Pennsylvania, and has been home to fraternities since the turn of the
twentieth century,105 including the Mu Theta chapter of Tau Kappa Epsilon
established in the 1968–69 term.106 Given the nature of small town life,
Greek-gown relations had historically been rather cooperative, with
fraternities working with the university to manage residential and
communal offerings.107 Indeed, in 2001 the school’s official magazine put
forth a retrospective on fifty years of Greek life that painted fraternities as
an essential social outlet for the university throughout their existence.108
The reality was not quite so harmonious, however: change had come
in 1975 when the college notified fraternities that “effective with the
1976–1977 academic year, the College’s residents’ policy will permit
students to live off campus in private housing or in fraternity houses only to
the extent that the number of resident students exceeds the capacity of the
residence halls.”109 In short, Lycoming instituted the same policy as had
Northern Illinois: students would only be permitted to patronize competing
residential providers if Lycoming ran short of space.110 The difference, of
course, was that Northern Illinois was a state school, immune from antitrust
scrutiny, whilst Lycoming was a private concern.
103. See supra text accompanying note 15.
104. Mu Theta of Tau Kappa Epsilon v. Lycoming Coll., 75 Pa. D. & C. 2d 420 (Pa. Ct.
C.P. 1976).
105. 50 Years of Fraternity Life at Lycoming College, LYCOMING C. MAG., Spring 2001,
at 1, 1–7. In explaining the genesis of Greek life at Lycoming College, the author of the
article wrote:
Fraternities arrived at Lycoming College at about the same time as the
institution became a four-year college. Theta Pi Pi was already there. Originally
a literary society, it was a local social organization dating back to 1905. But it
wasn’t the kind of national fraternity other colleges had.
Lambda Phi, organized itself in 1949 as a local fraternity, then petitioned to
become affiliated with Lambda Chi Alpha.
Id. at 1.
106. Compare 50 Years, supra note 105, at 2 (giving foundation as 1968), with
Lycoming Coll., 75 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 421 (giving foundation as 1969).
107. 50 Years, supra note 105, at 1–3; see Lycoming Coll., 75 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 421.
108. 50 Years, supra note 105, at 1–7.
109. Lycoming Coll., 75 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 422.
110. See Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi. v. Bd. of Regents for Regency Univs., 607 F.
Supp. 845, 846 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
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Lycoming provided “several reasons in justification of this decision: a
reduction in enrollment precluding the possibility of keeping the college’s
residence halls filled; an alleged illegality under Federal law in permitting
members of the fraternity to reside off campus; and general philosophic
considerations and attitudes of various members of the administration.”111
Setting aside the dubious reference to illegality112 and to individual
sentiments, the college thus advanced one overriding reason for its action:
it had costly residence halls going unused as matriculations fell and
students opted for other options, and sought to regain the revenues from the
space it had.113 The court suggested in American National Bank that such a
commercial motive might expose even a public school to antitrust liability
for lack of a basis in public policy.114 Other authorities have echoed that
parietal regulations will be struck down on other grounds if their sole
rationale is financial, as opposed to a legitimate educational aim.115
The difficulty for Lycoming was that the college’s own handbook
stated in no uncertain terms that providing students the option of living in
independently owned fraternity housing was an integral part of its
educational aims:
It is the purpose of Lycoming College to provide varied opportunities for
differing kinds of living experiences for its students, to the extent possible.
(a) The principal means by which Lycoming College attempts to meet this
obligation is by providing residence halls on its campus that are owned,
governed and supervised by the College . . . (b) The second means by
which Lycoming College provides varied living experiences is through the
opportunity for organized fraternal groups to purchase and operate their
own independent house off campus . . .116

111. Lycoming Coll., 75 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 422.
112. If allowing fraternity members to reside off-campus were actually illegal under
federal law, that illegality has apparently escaped the notice of the thousands of colleges and
millions of college students who have engaged in just such practices around the nation. But
cf. text quoted infra note 439 (making the same sort of argument).
113. See also Ward, supra note 34, at 231–34 (evaluating commercial motivations
generally for requiring residency given falling occupancy in residence halls); Mandatory
Housing Requirements, supra note 2, at 955.
114. Am. Nat’l Bank, 607 F. Supp. at 851.
115. See Prostrollo v. Univ. of S.D., 369 F. Supp. 778 (D.S.D.), rev’d, 507 F.2d 775 (8th
Cir. 1974); Pratz v. La. Polytechnic Inst., 316 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. La. 1970), appeal
dismissed, 401 U.S. 951, aff’d per curiam, 401 U.S. 1004 (1971); Ward, supra note 34, at
232–34 (discussing Mollere v. S.E. La. Coll., 304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. La. 1969)); Schick v.
Kent State Univ., Civil No. 74-646 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 19, 1975); see also Mandatory Housing
Requirements, supra note 2.
116. Lycoming Coll., 75 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 422 (quoting Lycoming College’s student
handbook, The Guidepost).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol39/iss1/2

18

Sunshine: Antitrust Precedent & Anti-Fraternity Sentiment: Revisiting Hamil

2017]

REVISITING HAMILTON COLLEGE

77

By its own account, not only was Lycoming failing to advance a
legitimate aim, it was actively thwarting one. When the Tau Kappa
Epsilon chapter sued over the college’s change in policy, it made much of
the college’s own emphasis on fraternities as an adjunct to its mission.117
Such a sacrifice of purported pedagogical benefit on the altar of pecuniary
gain should have at least piqued the court’s skepticism—had only the
plaintiff thought to plead violations of antitrust law.118 As the chapter did
not, however, the court made short work of dismissing its claims of
constitutional violations and equitable estoppel.119 The question of the
antitrust implications of plans like Lycoming’s would have to wait another
quarter century.120
2.

Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi v. Hamilton College

It would be redundant (and impossible) to duplicate the lavish detail
that Bauer brought to the practical and legal disputes between Hamilton
College and its fraternities; a summary treatment will suffice.121 Hamilton
has occupied a small rural town in upstate New York since its foundation in
1812, making it one of the oldest colleges in the United States.122 For most
of its existence, Hamilton had not prescribed any particular room and board
arrangements for its students other than freshmen, who were required to
live on campus.123 Upperclassmen had thus been free to patronize
fraternities for 150 years,124 and as of 1993 the university and fraternities
were splitting the housing market for students, albeit rather asymmetrically:
the university was grossing roughly $7 million per year for housing, while
fraternities together took in about $1 million.125 In the spring of 1995,
however, Hamilton abruptly promulgated a new policy, announcing that all
students in its small town would be required to purchase housing and
117. Id.
118. See id. at 422–23.
119. Id.
120. Numerous other lawsuits have been lodged challenging parietal rules on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds with varying degrees of success, but review of these would depart
overfar from the focus on the antitrust lens. See Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra
note 2.
121. See, e.g., Manley, supra note 15, at 1–2 (summarizing Bauer’s “thorough”
treatment of Hamilton College).
122. Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59, 61 (2d
Cir. 1997); see also Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 106 F.
Supp. 2d 406, 407 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
123. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 61; see also Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 407,
409.
124. See Bauer, supra note 1, at 368–69.
125. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 61.
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dining services from the college as of the autumn term.126 In service of the
new policy, Hamilton offered to purchase the chapterhouses of fraternities
that could no longer use them to house students.127 Claiming violations of
the Sherman Act, four fraternities sued under the theory that the college
was attempting to monopolize the housing market, exact supracompetitive
rental prices, and extort their valuable real estate at below-market prices.128
Hamilton moved to dismiss, arguing that the alteration to its
residential policy was noncommercial, or at least unrelated to interstate
commerce, and thus beyond the scope of the Sherman Act.129 The college
introduced evidence to show that its purpose was pedagogical, seeking to
curb the power of a male-dominated Greek system that it believed was
making the campus less desirable to female applicants, as well as
cultivating a reputation for providing an environment more focused on
social than academic pursuits.130 Other evidence, however, indicated that
Hamilton’s aim, like Lycoming’s, was to fill empty dormitories and pay
down debt incurred from their renovation.131 The district court, however,
disregarded the materials submitted by both sides, instead finding that the
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Act by the nature of the
college as an educational institution.132 The fraternities appealed.
The Second Circuit first recited the generous standards afforded
plaintiffs in a motion to dismiss, including the benefit of all reasonable
inferences and the assumption that properly pled allegations are true.133
The court then conducted a concise but exhaustive survey of competition
law in the college context, ranging from early cases applying antitrust
doctrine to non-profits to holdings like Brown University and Temple
University, making due note of American National Bank as “the only
reported case involving an antitrust challenge to a university housing policy

126. Id.; Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 407–08; see Robert E. Manley, Antitrust
Claim Reinstated at Hamilton College, FRATERNAL L., Nov. 1997, at 3.
127. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 61.
128. Id. at 61–62; id. at 66 (“They allege that Hamilton adopted the residential policy for
the commercial purpose of raising revenues by (1) forcing all Hamilton students to purchase
residential services from Hamilton; (2) allowing Hamilton to raise its prices for such
services; and (3) attempting to purchase the fraternity houses at below-market prices.”);
Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 407; Manley, supra note 126, at 3.
129. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 62; Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 407.
130. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 61; see also Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 407.
131. See Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 61; Bauer, supra note 1, at 371; Manley, supra note
126, at 3.
132. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 62; Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 407.
133. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 62–63.
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requiring certain students to live in university residence halls.”134 Taking
as true the fraternities’ allegations of competitive exploitation and that the
college’s proffered rationale was merely a pretext,135 the Second Circuit
straightforwardly reversed and remanded to the district court.136
On remand, the judge sua sponte bifurcated the case, directing the
parties to conduct circumscribed discovery only on the proper definition of
the relevant market, opining that “there appear to exist serious questions as
to whether plaintiffs have adequately plead the relevant product and
geographic markets in the first instance.”137 As intimated by this invitation,
the court went on to grant summary judgment to the college.138 Hamilton
successfully argued that the correct market encompassed all colleges that
were “reasonably interchangeable” with Hamilton itself, not the market for
residential housing in Clinton, New York.139 According to the court, this
was because “[p]rospective students who do not find Hamilton’s housing
policy attractive are free to choose to attend a different college.”140 And
there was no dispute that Hamilton possessed no market power in
competing for students with other schools.141
The court justified its holding by observing rather tautologically that
“[s]tudents do not—indeed cannot—shop separately for individual college
services or characteristics, but rather must select one college which offers a
group of services and qualities.”142 True, under Hamilton’s new policy,
students could not, but that begs the central question of the case: whether
the new policy disallowing students the option of choosing a Hamilton
education without Hamilton housing was anticompetitive.143 There was
certainly no infeasibility from a logistical perspective; before Hamilton’s
change of heart, students had shopped for these services separately,144 and
134. Id. at 64–65 (citing Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi. v. Bd. of Regents for
Regency Univs., 607 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Ill. 1984)); see also Manley, supra note 126, at 3
(discussing the Second Circuit’s analysis).
135. Id. at 66.
136. Id. at 67–68. The court expressed no view on the merits of the alleged Sherman Act
violation. Id. at 67 n.3.
137. Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 408.
138. Id. at 413–14.
139. Id. at 413.
140. Id. at 412.
141. Id. at 413.
142. Id. at 412.
143. See Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59, 60–
61 (2d Cir. 1997) (detailing plaintiffs’ allegations).
144. Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 408 (“Until September 1995, residential services
were provided to Hamilton students by a number of fraternities and private landlords in the
Clinton, New York area, as well as by Hamilton. Thereafter, all students have been required
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to the extent they selected Hamilton as their landlord, they were billed for
residential services independently from educational tuition.145 The court’s
unblinking acceptance that a practice that the market had followed for
hundreds of years had suddenly become impossible defies the standard for
summary judgment that there be no genuine issue for trial, resolving all
ambiguities in the non-moving party’s favor.146
The court’s prescription that prospective students opted for
Hamilton’s mandatory residential policies with eyes wide open also
ignored the plight of current students at the time the policy was announced,
who most certainly had not. Unfortunately, the plaintiffs had pled their
market as “residential services for students matriculating at Hamilton
College,”147 which the court interpreted as referring only to prospective
students.148 The court thus discounted as immaterial the plaintiffs’ cogent
argument that “after completing their first year at Hamilton, students have a
substantial investment in continuing to attend Hamilton, such that they
would not transfer to other colleges as a result of an increase in housing
costs or a decrease in housing quality.”149 From the perspective of
prospective students, Hamilton had changed the product it was offering, but
the court was convinced that those choosing amongst colleges would
consider Hamilton’s new policy and make an educated choice.150 The idea
of existing students (or, for that matter, existing fraternities) being locked
into Hamilton College went largely undeveloped.

to live in college-owned facilities and to purchase college-sponsored meal plans.”); see
Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 61.
145. Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 408 (“The expense of residential services has
always been a separate charge from tuition.”).
146. Id. at 410–11.
147. Id. at 412.
148. See id. at 412 n.6 (“Although plaintiffs submit evidence that, after completing their
first year at Hamilton, students have a substantial financial incentive to remain there to
complete their college education, the Court does not consider this a relevant factor in
defining the relevant market. Hamilton announced its new residential policy in Spring 1995.
Since that time, all prospective students have been able to consider Hamilton’s residential
policy and its economic impact in deciding which college to attend.”); e.g., id. at 412
(“Plaintiffs’ proposed market definition, which is too narrow to take into account the ability
of prospective students to choose to enroll elsewhere, fails to include all reasonably
interchangeable or substitutable products.”).
149. Id. at 413 (“[A]ll prospective students have been able to consider Hamilton’s policy
in deciding which college to attend.”).
150. Id. at 412.
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Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services

Before turning to the next college case, consider a brief diversion by
way of a thought experiment: suppose a consumer is considering investing
in one of the expensive optical SLR cameras favored by some photography
enthusiasts. There have undoubtedly been many competitors in that market
over the years: Canon, Nikon, Panasonic, Sony, Fujifilm, and Kodak have
all offered distinct products that afforded consumers different price points
and features. Once that choice is made, however, the consumer has a
substantial cost sunk into that device’s ecosystem, also known as an
aftermarket. That is, if one has purchased a Kodak camera, one must now
buy lenses compatible with the Kodak, replace broken parts with Kodak
equipment, and contract with repairmen who can service Kodak products.
The lifetime costs of all of these secondary services are not trivial.151
Given the aftermarket for demonstrably wealthy consumers who
possess Kodak cameras, there should be robust rivalry to provide these
services. But what if Kodak could keep anyone but its own agents from
participating in this market for camera-specific services? That could
provide a lucrative monopoly for Kodak, since eliminating competition
might allow Kodak to charge higher prices for the necessary lenses, parts,
and services. Even if it did not raise prices, Kodak would presumably earn
more with one hundred percent of the aftermarket than just a portion. But
would Kodak’s aftermarket monopoly be bad for consumers? Perhaps
consumers would evaluate the whole ecosystem when purchasing the
camera in the first place, and thus any competitive effects would be
incorporated in the original choice amongst robustly competing options.
Or, perhaps, enforcing a Kodak-only ecosystem would prove beneficial in
the balance, by providing a well-curated and more attractive deal for
consumers. Or, perhaps, the sales of cameras, parts, and repairs are all so
closely interlinked that they cannot be separated into discrete markets.152

151. See generally Jiaxuan Li, Gateway Products in the DSLR Camera Market: Dynamic
Demand, Consumer Learning and Switching Costs (Jan. 7, 2016) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation,
Boston
University),
http://people.bu.edu/jxli/files/jiaxuanli-dslr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/96RB-DJ8G]; e.g., Eric Pfanner, Fujifilm Finds Niche With Old-Style
Cameras That Mask a High-Tech Core, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/20/business/international/as-digital-camera-sales-sputterfujifilm-finds-its-niche.html? [https://perma.cc/TT23-PRN2]; Daisuke Wakabayashi, A New
Focus for Camera Makers, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 2012, 7:04 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304444604577342094118995830 [https://
perma.cc/2B9C-YH2V].
152. See Li, supra note 151.
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Such was the dilemma in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Services, Inc., decided by the Supreme Court in 1992.153 There, Kodak had
successfully sought to dominate the aftermarket for servicing its
photocopiers by refusing to sell replacement parts to competing
independent service organizations—which some customers had favored as
being of higher quality than Kodak’s in-house services.154 These
organizations brought suit under both clauses of the Sherman Act, alleging
that Kodak had illegally tied the sales of machine parts to servicing in order
to monopolize the aftermarket for Kodak photocopier servicing.155 Yet
Kodak enjoyed no dominant power in the primary market for photocopiers
itself. If consumers did not like Kodak’s control of the aftermarket, they
could always decline to patronize Kodak in the first place, or so the district
court must have reasoned in granting summary judgment in favor of
Kodak.156 The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that competition in the
primary market for copying equipment might not restrain anticompetitive
behavior in the aftermarket for replacement parts and service, and that
“sufficient evidence existed to support a finding that Kodak’s
implementation of its parts policy was ‘anticompetitive’ and ‘exclusionary’
and ‘involved a specific intent to monopolize.’”157
The Supreme Court affirmed by a 7–2 majority. As far as the “tying”
of the two items—that is, tethering Kodak’s near-monopoly on replacement
parts for Kodak machines to the market for servicing Kodak machines—the
Court held that to plead an antitrust violation, the tied markets must be
distinct enough that it was reasonable for participants to operate in each
market discretely, and yet the two had nonetheless been tied.158 This the
Court easily found on the alleged facts.159 The question then became
whether the primary market for the photocopiers necessarily prevented
Kodak from exercising dominant power in the aftermarket, which proved a
knotty question but one answered in the negative: even robust primary
market competition may still allow for domination of an aftermarket.160
The Court reasoned that it is costly (and sometimes impossible) for
153. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
154. Id. at 456–58.
155. Id. at 459.
156. Id. at 459. That was the reasoning adopted by the dissent at the Ninth Circuit in
favor of affirming the district court, in any event. Id. at 461; see Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 621–24 (9th Cir. 1990) (Wallace, J., dissenting), aff’d,
504 U.S. 451 (1992).
157. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 461 (quoting Eastman Kodak, 903 F.2d at 620).
158. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462.
159. Id. at 463.
160. Id. at 465–74.
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consumers to fully educate themselves about the lifetime costs of a product
a priori, and those less sophisticated may be particularly unable to do so.161
As for monopolization, the Court rejected out-of-hand Kodak’s claim
that sales of aftermarket services particular to a single brand per se could
“never be a relevant market under the Sherman Act.”162 Distinguishing
earlier precedent that found a single brand ecosystem is not necessarily its
own market, the Court stressed that the issue remained substitutability and
that plaintiffs had adequately alleged that there were no suitable substitutes
for Kodak parts and service, since no other parts or services would fit
Kodak devices.163 Indeed, the Court could cite a litany of lower court
decisions defining a market limited to a single brand ecosystem.164 The
result turned on whether Kodak had a legitimate reason for monopolizing
the market, or whether it acted “to foreclose competition, to gain a
competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor,” presenting an
eminently triable issue.165 Plaintiffs were thus entitled to proceed with their
claims that Kodak was illegally shutting them out of the aftermarket,166
eventually obtaining a $71.7 million verdict against Kodak after proving to
a jury their allegations of anticompetitive behavior.167
4.

Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale College

Eastman Kodak’s views of tying and aftermarket monopolization have
not been without their detractors,168 including on the Supreme Court
itself,169 but as one judge recently reminded, the opinion remains the “law
161. Id. at 474–77; see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15
n.24 (1984) (“Especially where market imperfections exist, purchasers may not be fully
sensitive to the price or quality implications of a tying arrangement, and hence it may
impede competition on the merits (citing Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in
Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U. L. REV. 661, 675–79
(1982))).
162. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481.
163. Id. at 482–83.
164. See id. at 482 n.31.
165. Id. at 483–85 (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948)).
166. Id. at 485–86.
167. See Image Tech. Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 136 F.3d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir.
1998) (“More than two years later, on September 19, 1995, a unanimous jury returned a
verdict in favor of Image Tech and the other ISO plaintiffs, and awarded $23,948,300 in
damages. After the trebling mandated by the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, the damages
award was $71.7 million.”).
168. See, e.g., Michael S. Jacobs, Market Power Through Imperfect Information: The
Staggering Implications of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services and a Modest
Proposal for Limiting Them, 52 MD. L. REV. 336 (1993).
169. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 486 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of the land” and the leading case on point.170 Indeed, it would not be much
exaggeration to call it one of the more eminent antitrust decisions of recent
times.171 It was thus less than a decade before the first attempted
application of its tying and aftermarket logic to college residential cases
appeared in Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale College.172 Yale imposed
a familiar parietal rule on its enrollees: all freshmen and sophomores were
required to live in college housing, except for those married or over
twenty-one years of age.173 Plaintiffs, for religious reasons, refused to live
in coeducational housing and therefore sought a waiver, which was
denied.174 They were therefore obliged to pay for rooms they could not
occupy even as they sought off-campus, single-sex housing arrangements,
and filed suit.175
Plaintiffs alleged two antitrust violations analogous to Eastman
Kodak. First, the plaintiffs claimed that Yale had illegally tied provision of
a Yale education to housing in the New Haven market.176 In sum, they
argued that a Yale education was so unique that it formed a relevant market
of its own and therefore that forcing unwanted housing on those who
wished to obtain a Yale degree was an unlawful exercise of market power
in violation of antitrust precedent.177 The court was unswayed by plaintiff’s
appeal that “a Yale degree is of incomparable value to potential employers
and to graduate schools and that only a Yale degree provides unique
lifetime advantages, including access to the worldwide network of Yale
alumni,”178 instead looking to precedent holding that the proper market was
170. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Terix Comp. Co., No. 5:13-cv-03385-PSG, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 158060, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2014).
171. See, e.g., id. at *14 (“seminal tying case”); Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int’l.,
Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 186, 214 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (“leading Supreme Court decision”); Delta
Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106, 115 (N.D.N.Y. 2007)
(“landmark case”); Josh Baskin, Note, Competitive Regulation of Mobile Software Systems:
Promoting Innovation Through Reform of Antitrust and Patent Laws, 64 HASTINGS L.J.
1727, 1734 (2013) (“seminal tying case”).
172. Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 16 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D. Conn. 1998),
aff’d, 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000).
173. Id. at 186.
174. Id. at 186–87.
175. Id. at 187. In addition to the antitrust claims discussed herein, plaintiffs also alleged
violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, violation of the Fair Housing
Act, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. Id. at 186.
176. Id. at 195 (“The amended complaint alleges that ‘by conditioning the provision of a
Yale education on the purchase of unrelated housing services, the defendants are engaged in
an illegal restraint of trade’, which is in violation of Section One of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.”).
177. Id. at 194.
178. Id.
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the set of all elite universities to which excellent students might aspire.179
Absent market power in a primary market for higher education, reasoned
the court, Yale could not be guilty of illegal tying.180
Plaintiffs also claimed that Yale had monopolized the aftermarket for
“Yale student housing,” which they claimed was an adequate definition
given that no other housing was reasonably interchangeable with Yale’s
provided dormitories in light of the school’s parietal rule.181 The court was
again unswayed, citing the analogous Rohlfing v. Manor Care, Inc.,182 in
which the plaintiffs had claimed a nursing home’s rule requiring residents
to use a specified medication provider monopolized that aftermarket.183
The Rohlfing court dismissed because “if the residents were not satisfied
with the pharmaceutical services or prices they could have selected a
different nursing home.”184 Similarly, the Yale College court dismissed
because “plaintiffs could have opted to attend a different college or
university if they were not satisfied with Yale’s housing policy,” given the
court’s prior ruling that Yale did not comprise a unique market of its
own.185
The failure of Yale College’s plaintiffs to escape dismissal likely lies
in the facts. It is intuitive to picture Kodak using its monopoly over
replacement parts to eliminate competition from independent servicers;
imagining Yale as wielding a monopoly in more intangible educational
services is more challenging. Beyond inartful pleading, however, the tying
and aftermarket claims are much the same. Yale competed with other
purveyors of education, and consumers made their choices. Once the
choice was made, however, Yale had locked-in consumers who could only
use Yale-supplied educational offerings, just as Kodak had locked-in
consumers who could only use Kodak-supplied parts.186 In an open
aftermarket for dormitory services, both Yale and private lessors would
presumably offer options. By using its power over its already-enrolled

179. Id. at 195.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 196.
182. Rohlfing v. Manor Care, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 330, 347 & n.23 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
183. Id. at 333–34.
184. Yale Coll., 16 F. Supp. 2d at 196 (citing Rohlfing, 172 F.R.D. at 346).
185. Id. at 197.
186. Of course, a student at Yale could theoretically abandon his commitment to Yale
and undertake the costly process of adopting a new university, just as the owner of a Kodak
device could abandon the use of that device and instead pay the cost of a new competing
device. But the presence of these so-called “switching costs” are precisely what being
“locked-in” means. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
473–477 (1992).
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students, however, Yale was able to enforce rules on the supply of its
educational services—they would only be given to those who use Yale
housing—that forced students to buy their housing.
This is
indistinguishable in principle from Kodak enforcing rules on the supply of
its replacement parts—they would only be given to those who used Kodak
repair services—that forced consumers to buy their repair services.
Advising Yale students that they should choose a different college would
be like telling Kodak owners they should choose a different photocopier:
the very argument the Supreme Court had thoroughly rejected at the
summary judgment stage.187
On appeal, the Second Circuit reiterated skepticism of the antitrust
claims but illuminated the reason further.188 The court again waved away
the argument that Yale was unique, repeating that if plaintiffs “were
dissatisfied with the Yale parietal rules, they could matriculate
elsewhere.”189 The court then offered a telling observation:
Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton College, supra,
is not to the contrary. The court there never reached the relevant market
issue, and, if it had, the considerations would have been quite different.
Plaintiffs in Hamilton were “locked in” by their investment in housing
which they could no longer use because of an abrupt change in policy.
That might have raised the concerns voiced in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), but those concerns are not
present here. Yale’s housing policies were fully disclosed long before
plaintiffs applied for admission. They had no “lock-in” costs.190

In reality, the court of appeals explained, Yale students were not
unfairly locked in at all.191 In Eastman Kodak, the Supreme Court
expressed concern that consumers, particularly unsophisticated ones, would
be unable or unwilling to analyze the long-term costs of the Kodak
ecosystem they were adopting and thereby become locked in
unwittingly.192 Disregarding this concern, the Yale College court implicitly
found the opposite: the adolescents deciding amongst colleges were
sophisticated enough to factor in the “fully disclosed” conditions of
housing prior to matriculating.193 At least, however, in distinguishing
Hamilton College, the Yale College rule discriminates between consumers
who notionally make a decision a priori as to their alma mater (warts,
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See id. at 464–77.
See Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 86–87.
Id. at 87.
Id.
Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 474–77.
Yale Coll., 237 F.3d at 86–87.
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parietal rules, and all) and a fraternity locked into a residential market long
ago that is only now being excluded by a dominant market power wielding
monopolistic parietal rules.
It is ironic, however, that the Second Circuit referenced Hamilton
College’s failure to reach the relevant market issue.194 In fact, by the time
the appellate decision in Yale College was released, the Hamilton College
district court had already ruled (six months earlier) that its plaintiffs had
failed to properly define a relevant market for exactly the same reasons
enunciated in Yale College: namely, that other colleges were
interchangeable with Hamilton, with no intimation of any Eastman Kodak
analysis.195 Had only the Hamilton College district court the benefit of the
Second Circuit’s wisdom in Yale College, “the considerations”—and
perhaps the result—“would have been quite different.”196
5.

Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v. Colgate University

When Bauer published his article in 2004, he could comment that
Hamilton College “is the only case ever to consider the issues discussed in
this article.”197 That is no longer true, and whilst it is fitting that the sequel
case should arise at Colgate University, which Bauer described as
Hamilton’s “chief rival,”198 it is unfortunate that the sequel should fall into
the same ruts of confusion as its predecessor. This is particularly so in light
of the Second Circuit’s guidance in the interim from Yale College that
fraternities with locked-in interests in residential property may well obtain
protections under the Supreme Court’s Eastman Kodak holding in the face
of an “abrupt change in policy.”199 Given direction from authority at the
appellate level and the Supreme Court, it is difficult to see where a district
court might go awry.
Yet Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v. Colgate University did just
that, to all appearances.200 Following an automobile accident in 2000,
Colgate University undertook a systematic reappraisal of its residential

194. Id. at 87.
195. Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d 406,
412–13 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
196. Yale Coll., 237 F.3d at 87.
197. Bauer, supra note 1, at 350.
198. Bauer, supra note 1, at 381. It is wryly amusing to note that Hamilton College is
located in Clinton, New York, while its archrival Colgate University is located in Hamilton,
New York.
199. Yale Coll., 237 F.3d at 87.
200. Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106
(N.D.N.Y. 2007).
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programs.201 As part of the resulting scheme, Colgate resolved to require
every student to live in college-owned housing; to accomplish this, Colgate
would derecognize any fraternity that refused to sell its property to Colgate,
thus allowing Colgate to become the sole provider of residential services.202
Colgate implemented its program, and most fraternities capitulated in
exchange for continued recognition, but when Delta Kappa Epsilon
refused, Colgate derecognized it, which had the effect of prohibiting the
fraternity from enrolling new members from the student body on penalty of
those members’ expulsion from the university.203 The Delta Kappa Epsilon
alumni association, which owned the fraternity house, filed suit under the
Sherman Act, alleging monopolization of the market for residential housing
around Colgate.204
The district court decided the case for Colgate on a motion for
summary judgment, after taking evidence from two experts.205 The court
appeared to accept that under the Eastman Kodak analysis, there could be
multiple markets: a competitive primary market for tertiary education in
which Colgate vied against other liberal arts institutions and a potentially
non-competitive aftermarket for residential housing.206 The question, as in
Eastman Kodak, was whether the competition in the primary market
restrained Colgate from exercising dominant power in the associated
housing aftermarket once students were locked into its educational
forum.207 There, the Supreme Court discerned strong evidence of
aftermarket power, such as supracompetitive pricing, dominant share, and

201. Id. at 107; Michelle York, Colgate Gains Ground in Legal Battle with Fraternities,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/13/education/colgate-gainsground-in-legal-battle-with-fraternities.html [https://perma.cc/3QML-8VQ7].
202. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 108; Robert E. Manley, Delta Kappa Epsilon
Sues Colgate, FRATERNAL L., Mar. 2005, at 1; York, supra note 201.
203. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 108; York, supra note 201 (“All but one of the
Greek-letter organizations turned over their property by this summer. Nearly all of the
university’s 2,750 students now live in buildings where campus officials can provide some
oversight. A sole Greek-letter organization, Delta Kappa Epsilon, did not sell. It was
derecognized. Colgate students are not permitted to live there or to participate in that
fraternity’s activities. If they do, they face disciplinary action, including expulsion.”).
204. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 107.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 114–16.
207. See id. at 116 (“Kodak does not transform every possessor of a dominant share in
the relevant aftermarket into a monopolist. Indeed, ‘[t]o create a triable question of
aftermarket monopoly power, the plaintiff must produce “hard evidence dissociating the
competitive situation in the aftermarket from activities occurring in the primary market.”’”
(citation omitted) (quoting Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 383 (3d
Cir. 2005))).
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“switching costs”;208 such evidence carried the day in the eventual
verdict.209 Equally clearly, Colgate had not been restrained by decreased
enrollment from the complete eradication of every competitor: even starker
evidence of power.210 And such an eradication is powerful prima facie
evidence that Colgate’s aim was “to destroy a competitor” under § 2 of the
Sherman Act.211 Such considerations should have convinced the court that
summary judgment was inappropriate, whatever the ultimate merits of the
case.212
The court strayed further, however, in its analysis of Delta Kappa
Epsilon’s strongest argument: the abrupt shift in residential policy
specifically victimized locked-in participants in the local housing market.213
Citing Hamilton College, the court found the abrupt change in policy
irrelevant and existing students’ inability to readily transfer out
immaterial.214 This astonishing result purportedly followed because
students matriculating at the college entered into an implied contract to
abide by Colgate’s parietal rules, whatever they might be in the future.215
Even if Colgate’s New Residential Program was unforeseeable a priori,
and students were compelled to accept it in light of onerous costs in
switching out of Colgate, they were evidently contractually bound to

208. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 465–74 (1992);
Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 115–16 (discussing Eastman Kodak’s findings).
209. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
210. See Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 110 (noting increased applications for
enrollment correlated to elimination of residential competitors). There were differing
theories for what the burgeoning enrollment meant: one expert declared it an indication that
Colgate’s offering was a pro-competitive improved product, id. at 110, whilst the other
expert explained it was because high school students were unable to discern the lifetime
costs of their education. Id. at 111. Such disputed questions of fact are precisely why
summary judgment was inappropriate. See Eastern Kodak, 504 U.S. at 486.
211. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483 (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100,
107 (1948)).
212. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 486 (“[W]e cannot reach these conclusions as a
matter of law on a record this sparse. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
denying summary judgment is affirmed.”).
213. See Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 116–17.
214. Id. at 116 (“As the Hamilton court remarked in regard to this very argument, this
assertion, ‘even if true . . . is not material.’” (quoting Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at
413)).
215. See id. (“Any housing constraints experienced by students who have chosen to
enroll despite the residential policy flow from their implied contract [with Colgate] to
comply with its rules, including the residential policy.” (quoting Hamilton Coll., 106 F.
Supp. 2d at 413)).
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accede to Colgate’s every whim, however exploitative.216 Such an
unconscionable outcome cannot be reconciled with Eastman Kodak’s
healthy acceptance of the realities of competition in an aftermarket, which
even Colgate University professed to acknowledge.217 Indeed, the rule that
Colgate University recited specifically counseled solicitude to the
fraternities’ position: “the decision in Kodak clarifies the relationship
between an appropriately alleged market and aftermarket, holding that
‘primary market competition does not necessarily preclude monopoly
power in the relevant aftermarket where a unilateral policy change targets
“locked-in” customers.’”218
The court’s rationale for jettisoning Eastman Kodak and effectively
indenturing Colgate’s students to the college, however, became apparent as
it expanded on its reasoning:
Here, Colgate and its students enter into a unique contractual
arrangement which governs both parties’ conduct during the tenure of their
relationship. . . .
Once a student decides to enroll in a particular college, a unique and
distinctive relationship commences between school and student that
governs that student’s four-year tenure. Over the next four years, an
undergraduate student lives and studies in a “quasi-parented” environment,
where the school, in loco parentis, creates and enforces policies for the
protection and welfare of its students. Here, Colgate has exercised these
rights, namely, its “parietal” rights, in creating a residential policy that is
part of a Colgate education. As such, the court holds, as a matter of law,
that Colgate’s residential policy is an effect of the exercise of its lawful and
appropriate parietal rights.219

Perplexingly, the court claimed that Yale College supported its
position, explaining that “[t]he Second Circuit has previously visited this
very issue.”220 Indeed it had: Yale College, it may be remembered, had
written that plaintiffs like those at Hamilton (or Colgate) subjected to an
abrupt change in policy that negated their investments in residential
property may well have a claim under the logic of Eastman Kodak.221
Needless to say, the Colgate University court did not cite that insight.

216. Without being overly flippant, such an unreasonable “contract” would quite literally
be “in restraint of trade.” See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
217. See Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 116 (“In broad terms, Kodak stands for the
proposition that market reality is the touchstone of antitrust analysis.” (quoting Harrison
Aire, Inc., 423 F.3d at 383)).
218. Id. (quoting Harrison Aire, Inc., 423 F.3d at 383).
219. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 117 (citations omitted).
220. Id. at 116.
221. Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 2000).
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Instead, it repeated the observation that if prospective students did not
approve of parietal rules, they could matriculate elsewhere.222 But as Yale
College recognized, that holding would have no bearing on the existing
students who had already matriculated at Colgate when the policy was
implemented who were in a “quite different” posture.223 All the more so,
the option to matriculate elsewhere was of no use at all to the Colgate
University plaintiff itself, which as a local fraternity chapter had been
“locked-in” to Colgate since its foundation and literally could not move
anywhere else. Fraternities themselves, captive to their host institutions,
are the most defenseless targets of colleges’ attempts at complete control.224
C. Collegiate Embargos on Fraternities
The core leverage the university wielded against the fraternity system
in the residential antitrust cases was recognition.225 By withholding that
recognition and forbidding its students from associating with unrecognized
groups, the university could starve rogue chapters into submission.226 The
alternative, presumably adopted by at least some ostensibly extinct
chapters, is to go “underground”227: to return to the strict secrecy that
characterized their earliest days, where colleges similarly threatened
students with expulsion for affiliation.228 Even the mere threat of
derecognition has been widely successful in coercing most fraternities into
selling their most valuable resources, their chapterhouses, in hopes of
simply being allowed to continue existing, albeit in a diminished and
noncompetitive state.229
222. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 117.
223. Yale Coll., 237 F.3d at 87.
224. See infra Section IV.B; Bauer, supra note 1, at 510–12.
225. See, e.g., Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 108.
226. See York, supra note 201 (“As part of the plan, [Colgate] told its Greek-letter
organizations that if they did not turn over their houses to the college, the fraternities and
sororities would not be recognized—meaning the end of all their activities.”); Fraternities
Go Underground to Defy College Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 1994), http://www.
nytimes.com/1994/08/29/us/fraternities-go-underground-to-defy-college-ban.html [https://
perma.cc/P5GM-68B2].
227. See, e.g., Fraternities Go Underground, supra note 226; Phelps v. President & Trs.
of Colby Coll., 595 A.2d 403, 403–04 (Me. 1991); Gosk, supra note 8, at 167–68 (detailing
Colby College’s attempts to root out “underground fraternities” after the school officially
banned such organizations).
228. See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text; see, e.g., People ex rel. Pratt v.
Wheaton Coll., 40 Ill. 186 (Ill. 1866) (student expelled for joining secret society).
229. See supra Section II.B; e.g., York, supra note 201 (“If they sold or donated their
houses, students could still belong to the [fraternal] organizations and still live in the houses,
though the college would essentially supervise them.”).
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Greek Nonrecognition as an Antitrust Issue

But universities brandish the stick of nonrecognition more broadly
than simply to stifle robust residential housing markets.230 The university’s
purported control of its student population would allow it to act as a
unilateral gatekeeper to its market, refusing to allow any particular new
group access to students in order to compete with incumbents.231
Suggestions that a fraternity chapter could simply operate elsewhere defy
the basic definition of a fraternity vis-à-vis undergraduates.232 Universities
may simply be favoring those groups who conform to the college’s
expectations of academic rigor and extracurricular probity,233 or more
actively manipulating the supply conditions for other services fraternities
provide.234 The motivation for manipulation can be self-evident: a college
desirous of providing dining facilities in exchange for additional fees from
students, for example, would benefit from eliminating fraternity
competitors who might seek to offer competing dining options of higher
quality or at lower prices.235
230. See Robert E. Manley, Antitrust Laws Affect the Campus, FRATERNAL L., Nov.
1995, at 3 (“Any arrangement that excludes access of a particular fraternity to a particular
campus without approval of the campus IFC or the campus Panhellenic probably violates
the antitrust laws.”).
231. See Sunshine, Fraternity as Franchise, supra note 3, at 405–06; Manley, supra note
230, at 3 (“Policies of colleges to exclude particular fraternities unless they have campus
IFC or campus Panhellenic approval probably violate antitrust laws.”); Robert E. Manley,
New Risks Facing Campus IFCs and Panhellenic Conferences, FRATERNAL L., Jan. 1992, at
4–5 (“When a campus IFC or Panhellenic votes to recommend that the university not
recognize a colony of a new group, it may be engaging in a conspiracy with the university
to . . . violate the antitrust laws by restricting access to the campus market by a new
group.”).
232. See, e.g., Psi Upsilon of Phila. v. Univ. of Pa., 591 A.2d 755, 761 (Pa. Super. 1991)
(“The Recognition Policy to which appellant was signatory establishes the responsibility of
the fraternity as an entity for acts of its members which have been determined to be
improper. The result of such a conclusion is not appellants’ inability to function as the social
organization it, in fact, is, but only its inability to function under the auspices of that
institution whose rules its members have broken. No limitations have been placed upon its
continued operation outside the University.”).
233. See, e.g., Beta Sigma Rho, Inc. v. Moore, 46 Misc. 2d 1030, 1033–34 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1965).
234. See Sunshine, Fraternity as Franchise, supra note 3, at 405.
235. See, e.g., Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp.
2d 406, 407 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Until September 1995, residential services were provided to
Hamilton students by a number of fraternities and private landlords in the Clinton, New
York area, as well as by Hamilton. Thereafter, all students have been required to . . .
purchase college-sponsored meal plans.”); Cowboy Book Ltd. v. Bd. of Regents for Agric.
& Mech. Colls. ex rel. Okla. State Univ. of Agric. & Applied Sci., 728 F. Supp. 1518, 1523
(W.D. Okla. 1989) (quoted supra text accompanying note 89).
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In their regulation of fraternities, universities often recite pieties about
improving the lot of students generally by reducing social stratification,
eliminating dangerous or disruptive influences, or creating a living
environment consistent with the college’s ideological message.236 Surely,
goes the argument, the university is bettering the competitive market by
protecting consumers of educational services from social exclusion and
psychic injury, eliminating participants who might harm consumers, or
simply providing consumers with what the university thinks is best.237
Colgate, indeed, argued strenuously that denying students the choice to
patronize fraternities and unifying the provision of residential services
under its control improved the educational experience,238 and the Colgate
University court agreed that the school could act unilaterally “for the
protection and welfare of its students.”239 But judges have heard similar
reasoning from colleges before and should not be fooled:
“The argument is, in essence, that an unrestrained market in which
consumers are given access to the information they believe to be relevant to
their choices will lead them to make unwise and even dangerous choices.
Such an argument amounts to ‘nothing less than a frontal assault on the
basic policy of the Sherman Act.’”
Both the public safety justification rejected by the Supreme Court in
Professional Engineers and the public health justification rejected by the
Court in Indiana Dentists were based on the defendants’ faulty premise that
consumer choices made under competitive market conditions are “unwise”
or “dangerous.”240

What rationale, in short, could justify completely removing the choice
of where they reside from consumers themselves? Colgate characterized
its purportedly protecting students’ safety and health (apparently, from
their own bad decisions) as “pro-competitive,”241 but that brand of lofty

236. See, e.g., Beta Sigma Rho, 46 Misc. 2d at 1033–34 (discussing report of the State
University of New York explaining why national fraternities were deleterious to the campus
population on each of these axes); see also Manley, supra note 230, at 3 (“Any arrangement
that gives quotas to individual chapters on an individual campus probably violates the
antitrust law. The fact that these arrangements are designed to encourage a wholesome
Greek system or good educational opportunities is no defense.”).
237. See, e.g., Beta Sigma Rho, 46 Misc. 2d at 1033–34; Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni
Corp. v. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106, 116–17 (N.D.N.Y. 2007).
238. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 110.
239. Id. at 117.
240. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 676–77 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted)
(quoting FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986)).
241. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 110.
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paternalism infantilizes and disenfranchises students qua market
participants, making them effective wards of the university.242
Indeed, incumbents can often lodge self-serving arguments about
safety and traditional wisdom in support of their actions barring rivals from
a market.243 Particularly where access to the market is highly regulated,
barriers to entry may be raised so high as to prevent effective competition
from interlopers.244 Such behavior is widely known as a form of
rent-seeking:245 the practice by which organized incumbents importune
lawmakers to hinder competition from others through licensure, board
regulation, or quotas.246 To avoid unseemly appearances, the pretext for
this legislation or regulation is often given as promoting public health and
welfare.247 Yet even such obvious favoritism is problematic to challenge
legally due to state-action Parker immunity;248 Parker itself condoned a
sort of rent-seeking in allowing California to regulate the market for raisins

242. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
243. E.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
244. See, e.g., John S. Elson, The Governmental Maintenance of the Privileges of Legal
Academia: A Case Study in Classic Rent-Seeking and a Challenge to Our Democratic
Ideology, 15 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 269 (2001).
245. See id. at 270 (“Here, I define rent-seeking in a conventional, but very restricted
sense, as the phenomenon by which a cartel obtains governmentally imposed restrictions on
entry to the market in which the cartel members sell their goods or services in order that
they can obtain higher profits than they otherwise would in open market competition.”); see
also George F. Will, Op-Ed., Supreme Court has a chance to bring liberty to teeth
whitening, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/georgewill-supreme-court-has-a-chance-to-promote-cleaner-competition/2014/10/10/13a3a2c0-4fd
8-11e4-babe-e91da079cb8a_story.html [https://perma.cc/52YH-DGKQ] (defining rentseeking as the “unseemly yet uninhibited scramble of private interests to bend government
power for their benefit”).
246. Elson, supra note 244, at 269–72; Will, supra note 245 (“Today, factions enrich
themselves through occupational licensure laws unrelated to public safety. Such laws are
growth-inhibiting and job-limiting, injuring the economy while corrupting politics. They
are residues of the mercantilist mentality, which was a residue of the feudal guild system,
which was crony capitalism before there was capitalism. Then as now, commercial interests
collaborated with governments that protected them against competition.”).
247. E.g., Will, supra note 245 (The North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners
“protects the economic interests of those who elect it, by pretending to protect North
Carolinians from the supposed danger of unlicensed people participating in the business of
‘teeth whitening.’”); Elson, supra note 244, at 273–76.
248. See William H. Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v.
Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618, 619; Will, supra note
245 (“When the Federal Trade Commission initiated an action against the dental board’s
behavior, the board said it could not be found in violation of federal antitrust laws because it
enjoys ‘Parker immunity.’”).
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“so as to restrict competition among the growers and maintain prices in the
distribution of their commodities to packers,” notwithstanding the Sherman
Act.249 At the very least, private institutions should not accrue such
prerogatives.
This risk of anticompetitive results can be greatest where market
participants act as the regulators for their own markets as, for example,
Hamilton College argued it did in promulgating parietal rules for the
student population.250 Based on purported authority for concerted action,
self-regulators may try to claim immunity from antitrust laws.251 Absent
statutory authority authorizing anticompetitive conduct, however, when
self-regulating industries exclude competitors from the market, they are
engaged in nothing more than a transparently unlawful boycott.252 And
educators are assuredly held to task in some self-regulatory contexts,
notably their athletic program cartels.253 Yet tension arises given
cases holding that the quintessential expression of schools’
self-regulation—academic accreditation—is a non-commercial activity
beyond the scope of antitrust law.254 In any event, the Second Circuit
rejected the notion that the recognition of fraternities on campus
categorically exceeds the reach of antitrust law.255
2.

Legal Precedent on Systemic Interdiction of Fraternities

And yet, despite these lucid competitive concerns, the roll of cases
considering universities’ rights to refuse to recognize fraternities (and expel
students who join them) is uniform: Supreme Court justices to county court
judges have afforded colleges untrammeled discretion to regulate the lives
249. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 346 (1943); see also Will, supra note 245.
250. See Bauer, supra note 1, at 373 n.210 (“Hamilton also argued that a college’s
self-regulation was immune from antitrust scrutiny. The antitrust laws, however, place a
legislative limit on self-regulation which restrains trade. See, e.g., Silver v. N. Y. Stock
Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 360 (1963). Accordingly, Hamilton’s status as a self-regulating
organization was insufficient to defeat the fraternities’ complaint. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d
at 64.”).
251. See, e.g., Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
252. See HYLTON, supra note 46, at 166–85 (“Boycotts”); e.g., Nw. Wholesale Stationers
v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985); Silver, 373 U.S. 341.
253. E.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); NCAA v.
Law, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
254. See, e.g., Marjorie Webster Junior Coll., Inc. v. Middle States Assoc. of Coll. &
Secondary Sch., Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970); Found.
for Interior Design Educ. Research v. Savannah Coll. of Art & Design, 73 F. Supp. 2d 829
(W.D. Mich. 1999).
255. Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59 (2d Cir.
1997).
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of their students and extirpate organizations that do not meet their approval,
without so much as a footnote given over to antitrust implications.256 The
first such case dates back to the middle of the nineteenth century,257 and the
court’s own summary is as concise as any: “E. Hartley Pratt, a student in
Wheaton college, joined a secret society known as the Good Templars, in
violation of the college rules. For this the faculty ‘suspended him from the
privileges of the institution until he should express a purpose to conform to
its rules.’”258 His father brought a suit for mandamus that his son be
reinstated, but the court demurred, finding the college free to make
whatever rules it wished for its governance.259 The student “has an
undoubted legal right to join either Wheaton college or the Good
Templars”260—but not both.
The Supreme Court adopted like reasoning in Waugh v. Board of
Trustees of University of Mississippi.261 There, the university had adopted
measures that prohibited the enrollment or granting of degrees to anyone
affiliated with a fraternity or sorority, and an applicant to the law school
refused to sign the pledge that he was not so affiliated.262 Instead, he
brought a lawsuit alleging the university had deprived him of liberty,
property, and his rightful pursuit of happiness under the Fourteenth
Amendment without due process of law.263 The Court was unpersuaded,
concluding that such rights “are subject in some degree to the limitations of
the law, and the condition upon which the State of Mississippi offers the
complainant free instruction in its University, that while a student there he

256. See, e.g., Waugh v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Miss., 237 U.S. 589 (1915); Chi Iota
Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007);
Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pitt., 229 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2000); Phi Kappa Tau
Chapter House Ass’n of Miami Univ. v. Miami Univ., No. 1:12-CV-657, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15030 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 4, 2013); Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of the Univ. of
Colo., 258 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1966); Webb v. State Univ. of N.Y., 125 F. Supp. 910
(N.D.N.Y. 1954); Iowa Beta Chapter of Phi Delta Theta Fraternity v. State, 763 N.W.2d 250
(Iowa 2009); Phelps v. President & Trs. of Colby Coll., 595 A.2.d 403 (Me. 1991); Beta
Sigma Rho, Inc. v. Moore, 4 Misc. 2d 1030 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1965); Psi Upsilon of Phila. v.
Univ. of Pa., 591 A.2d 755 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Mu Theta of Tau Kappa Epsilon v.
Lycoming Coll., 75 Pa. D. & C. 2d 420 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1976).
257. People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton Coll., 40 Ill. 186, 186 (Ill. 1866).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 188.
261. Waugh v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Miss., 237 U.S. 589 (1915).
262. Id. at 591–93.
263. Id. at 594.
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renounce affiliation with a society which the state considers inimical to
discipline.”264
Such logic has featured in numerous other cases concerning state
institutions.265
Judges have held that a state is free to delegate
quasi-legislative powers to the regents overseeing the states’ educational
institutions to set regulations as they see fit.266 Through these regulations,
the “state may adopt such measures, including the outlawing of certain
social organizations, as it deems necessary to its duty of supervision and
control of its educational institutions.”267 This is particularly the case when
the state excludes organizations that purportedly discriminate on the basis
of protected classes, given the state’s constitutional duties.268 Even
considered in light of competitive concerns, the logic is hard to assail, as
the state enjoys immunity from antitrust liability in any event: if a state’s
public policy is to disallow fraternities from competition, the Sherman Act
cannot stop it.269 Whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments impose
restraints on state action based on students’ freedom of association is a
different and well-studied question.270
But courts have also condoned private universities’ plenary privilege
to interdict disfavored organizations.271 In Phelps v. President & Trustees
of Colby College,272 the remaining members of the local chapter of Lambda
264. Id. at 597.
265. See, e.g., Webb v. State Univ. of N.Y., 125 F. Supp. 910 (N.D.N.Y. 1954); Beta
Sigma Rho, Inc. v. Moore, 4 Misc. 2d 1030 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1965); Sigma Chi Fraternity v.
Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 258 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1966).
266. Beta Sigma Rho, 4 Misc. 2d at 1035.
267. Webb, 125 F. Supp. at 912 (citing Waugh, 237 U.S. 589; Hughes v. Caddo Parish
Sch. Bd., 57 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. La. 1944), aff’d, 65 S. Ct. 562 (1945)).
268. See, e.g., Sigma Chi Fraternity, 258 F. Supp. 515 (upholding state school’s ability
to expel a fraternity that discriminated on the basis of race); Beta Sigma Rho, 4 Misc. 2d at
1033–34 (“One of the pillars upon which State University of New York was founded is that
educational opportunities be made available to those qualified, without regard to race, color,
religion, creed or national origin. It would be sophistry for the State University to vigorously
combat discrimination in its admissions and academic policies and, at the same time,
condone those practices among the extracurricular organizations recognized by it.” (quoting
a study of State University of New York fraternities and social organizations)).
269. See, e.g., supra note 265 and accompanying text.
270. See generally, e.g., Bauer, supra note 2; James C. Harvey, Fraternities and the
Constitution: University-Imposed Relationship Statements May Violate Student
Associational Rights, 17 J.C. & U.L. 11 (1990); Gregory F. Hauser, Social Fraternities at
Public Institutions of Higher Education: Their Rights Under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 433 (1990); Gosk, supra note 8.
271. See, e.g., Psi Upsilon of Phila. v. Univ. of Pa., 591 A.2d 755, 762 (Pa. Super. 1991);
People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton Coll., 40 Ill. 186, 188 (Ill. 1866).
272. Phelps v. President & Trs. of Colby Coll., 595 A.2d 403 (Me. 1991).
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Chi Alpha challenged Colby’s decision in 1984 to ban all fraternities from
campus; to prohibit the practice of rushing, pledging, and initiating; and to
expel students for failure to comply.273 They argued that the Maine Civil
Rights Act barred the private college from restricting the students’ freedom
of speech and association by banning their fraternity.274 The Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine declined to decide the difficult question of whether
the students’ or college’s associational rights took precedence and simply
held the Act did not reach such disputes.275 Unaddressed was whether a
private institution could, consistent with antitrust law, really take the severe
step of eradicating every other institution from the market.276 Of course,
the residential cases discussed earlier in this Part were not so shy,
dismissing any fears anent robust competition when universities eliminated
their rivals in order to secure their own control over students’ lives.277
And there is little doubt that dominion over students’
choices—residential and otherwise—is the aim of such fraternity
interdictions.278 Universities still seem to view themselves as exclusively
responsible for the care and conduct of their students to the point that alien
organizations that challenge their control must be quashed or coopted.279
As the epigram to this Article explained, this perspective is hardly different
than that of garden-variety monopolists, who desire complete control over
273. Id. at 403–04.
274. Id. at 404. Almost uniquely, the Maine Civil Rights Act restricts private institutions
from infringing rights analogous to those found in the Bill of Rights, which is only
applicable to the government absent such a statute.
275. Id. at 407–08. The question is difficult because enforcing one group’s associational
rights often conflicts with another party’s: here, the fraternity members sought the right to
associate with one another, but enforcing that right implicated the university’s right not to
associate with them. See generally LAURENCE A. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
15-17, at 1401–07 (2d ed. 1988).
276. See Colby Coll., 595 A.2d at 407–08; Gosk, supra note 8, at 167–68.
277. See supra Section II.B.
278. See, e.g., Op-Ed., Harvard’s Final Insult, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 17, 2016, 11:20 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/harvards-final-insult-1460759189
[https://perma.cc/RUT86W66] (“Campus leftists, who once protested in loco parentis regulations, now aspire to
total control of student life. They can’t abide the existence of free institutions beyond their
supervision, much less leaving young people alone to determine for themselves the activities
that are valuable to their college experience.”); Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v.
Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106, 117 (N.D.N.Y. 2007); see also McCauley v. Univ. of
V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 247 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[U]niversity students, unlike public elementary and
high school students, often reside in dormitories on campus, so they remain subject to
university rules at almost all hours of the day.”); Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 516
(Del. 1991) (“[T]he modern university provides a setting in which every aspect of student
life is, to some degree, university guided.”).
279. See supra Part I.
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their domains.280 Such accretion of power is clearly not limited to
traditional businesses: in the seminal NCAA case, the trial court luridly
condemned a “classic cartel” of colleges exerting “absolute control” over
its product, which “like all other cartels” demanded artificially high
payments, imposed characteristic production limits and punished
noncompliance, fixed prices irrespective of demand, and “like all cartels,”
parceled out its inflated revenues to its members formulaically.281
To conclude, as did Hamilton College,282 that the proper market is
larger than the college town ignores the reality that locked-in collegians are
in fact not free to transfer universities at will.283 Moreover, contra Yale
College’s rule,284 it is distinctly unlikely students considered and accepted
the effects of parietal regulations on their long-term educational experience
and student debt.285 And regardless of Colgate University’s tortured
quasi-contractual logic,286 no such consideration can be imputed to students
and societies who did not sign up for bans on fraternities but had them
imposed in medias res.287 Some colleges have recognized these realities.288
Why then are others allowed such domineering control, amounting to
“nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman

280. See supra text accompanying note 1; see also infra notes 504–05 and
accompanying text.
281. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1300–01 (W.D.
Okla. 1982), aff’d in part & rev’d in part on other grounds, 707 F. 2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983),
aff’d, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
282. See supra notes 139–41, 147–50 and accompanying text.
283. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 474–77 (1992)
(discussing the potentially anticompetitive effects of switching costs for locked-in
consumers).
284. See Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000); see also
supra notes 181–85, 188–91 and accompanying text.
285. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 474–77 (finding that consumers cannot always
assess aftermarket costs a priori).
286. See supra notes 213–19 and accompanying text.
287. See Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 2000).
288. See Timothy M. Burke, The Dartmouth Decision: The End of Another Greek
System?, FRATERNAL L., Mar. 1999, at 2 (“In an interview with The Dartmouth, President
Wright appeared to recognize many of the difficulties likely to face the College if it were to
attempt the total elimination of the Greek system. Apparently, recognizing that in many
cases students have made commitments to fraternities and sororities and perhaps with the
understanding that fraternities and sororities and their house corporations have made
significant investments based upon the existence of the Greek system at Dartmouth,
President Wright said ‘we want to work through this and make sure it works well. We don’t
want people to have made commitments or participating in organizations with certain
understandings. We are not going to suddenly put them out. We don’t have the authority to
put them out. Most of these houses are privately owned.’”).
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Act[?]”289 The answer is intimated by opinions distinguishing the
academic world from the commercial, even if antitrust analysis still
nominally applies.290 The question of what this distinction really is shifts
the analysis to a new body of law.
III. LESSONS FOR GREEK-GOWN RELATIONS FROM PARENTAL AND
PARIETAL RIGHTS
Various authorities discussed herein refer to a unique relationship
between a university and its student;291 indeed, some required this sui
generis status as justification for their holdings.292 This special relationship
between universities and their students has gone by several names, the most
common of which are the doctrine of in loco parentis and parietal rights
already mentioned in the cases.293 The former literally means “in the place
of the parent,” and hearkens to the idea that the university in its role as
schoolmaster has been literally invested with the power of its students’

289. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 677 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting FTC v. Ind.
Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986)) (quoted supra note 240).
290. See, e.g., Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106,
117 (N.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 670–73 (3d Cir. 1993).
291. See supra Section II.B; see also Hauser, supra note 270, at 456–57 (discussing
excessive regulations on fraternities that amount to constitutional violations); Op-Ed.,
Harvard’s Final Insult, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 17, 2016, 11:20 AM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/harvards-final-insult-1460759189
[https://perma.cc/RUT8-6W66]
(discussing
Harvard’s purge of political clubs).
292. E.g., Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 117; Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale
Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 85 (2d. Cir. 2000).
293. See, e.g., Philip Lee, The Curious Life of In Loco Parentis at American Universities,
8 HIGHER EDUC. REVIEW 65 (2011); Nicholas Sweeton & Jeremy Davis, Note, The
Evolution of In Loco Parentis, 13 J. STUDENT AFF. 67 (2004); Peter F. Lake, The Rise of
Duty and the Fall of In Loco Parentis and Other Protective Tort Doctrines in Higher
Education Law, 64 MO. L. REV. 1 (1999); Robert D. Bickel & Peter F. Lake,
Reconceptualizing the University’s Duty to Provide a Safe Learning Environment: A
Criticism of the Doctrine of In Loco Parentis and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 20 J.C.
& U.L. 261 (1994); Jackson, supra note 24; Theodore C. Stamatakos, Note, The Doctrine of
In Loco Parentis, Tort Liability, and the Student-College Relationship, 65 IND. L.J. 471
(1990); James J. Szablewicz & Annette Gibbs, Colleges’ Increasing Exposure to Liability:
The New In Loco Parentis, 16 J.L. & EDUC. 453 (1987); Gerald A. Fowler, The Legal
Relationship Between the American College Student and the College: An Historical
Perspective and the Renewal of a Proposal, 13 J.L. & EDUC. 401 (1984); Richard Cranmer
Conrath, In Loco Parentis: Recent Developments in This Legal Doctrine as Applied to the
University-Student Relationship in the United States of America, 1965–75 (June 1976)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Kent State University Graduate School of Education),
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED136672.pdf [https://perma.cc/YP3W-EHRY].
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parents to control, forbid, and discipline.294 Parietal rights refer to a more
specific application of the same notion: the right of a university to impose
regulations for those living within its metaphorical (and literal) walls,
particularly with regard to enforcing traditionalist mores prohibiting
intermingling of the sexes.295 Although there is some looseness of
definition, most authorities consider parietal rights a subset of the more
general principle of in loco parentis as applied to housing matters.296
In its general application to college students, the in loco parentis
doctrine is of ancient origin297 but has been met with powerful opposition
by the judiciary in the last half century, and most courts now describe it as
a dead letter in the university context, or at a minimum severely undercut in
logic and theory.298 In fraternity cases, it has been rejected time and time
again.299 The particular subset of parietal rights and responsibilities,
however, still appears to have some staying power.300 Whether this is
because courts now see residential issues as distinguishable from the
justifications for rejecting in loco parentis, or whether parietal rights have
always enjoyed their own independent rationale, modern cases somehow

294. See Lee, supra note 293, at 66; Stamatakos, supra note 293, at 473–74.
295. See Ward, supra note 34; Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note 2.
296. See Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106, 117
(N.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoted supra text accompanying note 221); Fowler, supra note 293, at 48
(“Even with the return of the World War II veterans, colleges continued to assert the in loco
parentis role; they administered numerous parietal rules which were often enforced with
little regard for the privacy or due process rights of students.”); Richard B. Evans, Note, “A
Stranger in a Strange Land”: Responsibility and Liability for Students Enrolled in ForeignStudy Programs, 18. J.C. & U.L. 299, 300 (1991) (“Most university administrators
embraced the in loco parentis doctrine and imposed numerous parietal rules.”); Conrath,
supra note 293, at 39 (“[Clarence J. Bakken] outlines three basic areas of college life where
in loco parentis is most applicable: student activities, housing, and student discipline.
Bakken feels that the parietal rule used in housing is only one aspect of the more basic rule
that governs the entirety of college life, that is, in loco parentis. He feels, however, that this
rule, intended primarily to allow a university to require that unmarried minors live ‘in
college-approved housing under rules and regulations established for their physical, moral,
and mental protection,’ should be carefully reevaluated before being applied to adults.”
(footnote omitted) (quoting Clarence J. Bakken, Legal Aspects of In Loco Parentis, 8 J.C.
STUDENT PERSONNEL 234, 235 (1967))); Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note 2, at
995–97 (discussing parietal rules under in loco parentis rubric).
297. See infra Sections III.A.1, III.A.2.
298. See infra Section III.A.3.
299. See infra Section III.B.
300. See infra Section III.C.
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treat the university’s special relationship in residential life as less
questionable than in other areas.301
A. The Decline and Fall of In Loco Parentis
To understand why in loco parentis has fallen so dramatically from
favor, it will be necessary to trace its evolution from the earliest legal
tractates to its emphatic rejection in colleges in the latter half of the
twentieth century. As with many bodies of law, the reason for its
abandonment is substantially due to societal upheavals rather than purely
jurisprudential reevaluation.302 In the case of in loco parentis, that
upheaval was the broad and university-focused rejection of traditional
authority figures during the tumultuous decade of the 1960s.303 Collegians
forcefully emancipated themselves from the tutelage of the university,
dispelling the foundation of the in loco parentis doctrine’s application to
them.304 The passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution in 1971 only formalized what the previous decade had amply
proven: college men and women were to be treated as full-fledged adults.305
1.

Blackstone and the Presumption of Paternalism

The original formulation of the in loco parentis doctrine dates back to
William Blackstone, who explained in his Commentaries that a parent
“may . . . delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor
or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a
portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of
restraint and correction, as may be necessary.”306 Blackstone’s reference to
“correction” is a euphemism for the original context in which the doctrine
was asserted: as an affirmative defense by schoolmasters rebutting claims
of battery lodged by their pupils.307 One early case, for example, concerned

301. Cf. Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note 2, at 998–1000 (examining
whether justifications for parietal rules can be disentangled from their wellspring in the in
loco parentis doctrine).
302. See Sunshine, Lazarus Taxon, supra note 3, at 81, 110–11.
303. See infra notes 349–54 and accompanying text.
304. See Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 139–40 (3d Cir. 1979); Lee, supra note
293, at 76.
305. See Lee, supra note 293, at 69, 76; Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 197 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring); Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 140.
306. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (quoting 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *441).
307. See Jackson, supra note 24, at 1144.
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a student’s being whipped for referring to his instructor disrespectfully.308
These original conceptions of in loco parentis were limited to primary and
secondary schools, where the pupils were legal minors and thus the
parental power conveyed to the schoolmaster was absolute.309 Given the
dependability that such students were minors, the doctrine conceptually
became more anchored to the relationship of tutor to tutee as justification
even when a peculiar student happened to exceed the age of majority.310
As adopted and applied in America in the nineteenth century, the
doctrine of in loco parentis came to afford nigh boundless authority on
schools to regulate and discipline their students, subject only to limitations
on the most extreme forms of corporal punishment: batteries done with
malice, causing permanent injury, or that are clearly excessive.311 Any
other rule or conduct was within the school’s prerogative; or as Justice
Clarence Thomas has summarized: “The doctrine of in loco parentis
limited the ability of schools to set rules and control their classrooms in
almost no way.”312 Although such power is fundamentally despotic, its
scope was widely accepted313 and rooted in the notion that primary
education served the vital end of instilling civic virtue and moral probity;
the teacher
must govern these pupils, quicken the slothful, spur the indolent, restrain
the impetuous, and control the stubborn. He must make rules, give
commands, and punish disobedience. What rules, what commands, and
what punishments shall be imposed, are necessarily largely within the
discretion of the master.314

Given the students’ status as children, moreover, such absolute
authority is not completely surprising. The law, after all, still recognizes
the entitlement of parents today to arbitrarily employ corporal punishment
and otherwise exert control over their children315—actions that would be

308. Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 115 (1859); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S.
393, 414–15 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing Lander).
309. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 413.
310. E.g., Morse, 551 U.S. at 413 n.3 (“My discussion is limited to elementary and
secondary education. In these settings, courts have applied the doctrine of in loco parentis
regardless of the student’s age. Therefore, the fact that Frederick was 18 and not a minor
under Alaska law is inconsequential.” (citations omitted)).
311. Id. at 416.; see Dean v. State, 8 So. 38, 39 (Ala. 1890).
312. Morse, 551 U.S. at 416.
313. Id. at 414 n.4.
314. Patterson v. Nutter, 7 A. 273, 274 (Me. 1886) (quoted in Morse, 551 U.S. at 414).
315. E.g., In re Welfare of the Children of N.F. & S.F., 749 N.W.2d 802, 810 (Minn.
2008) (“We are unwilling to establish a bright-line rule that the infliction of any pain
constitutes either physical injury or physical abuse, because to do so would effectively
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wholly repugnant to the Constitution and statute were they taken against a
competent adult.316 Yet there was a further justification: the judiciary’s
desire to avoid meddling with the internal function and disciplinary
procedures of the school to whose governance the student was submitted.317
This latter rationale would prove to be the medium by which in loco
parentis successfully transposed itself to tertiary education at colleges and
universities.
2.

Paternalism in Institutes of Higher Education

The extension of in loco parentis from children enrolled in primary
school to university students might appear a substantial leap to modern
eyes. But one must recall that for much of American history, students in
universities were not yet considered adults and were usually legal
minors.318 The academic career’s progression to institutions of higher
education was far less ossified, and students often matriculated at colleges
well before the age of eighteen.319
Tutors and professors were
disciplinarian overseers of a strictly defined code of conduct and uniform
syllabus that mirrored children’s academies: Greek and Latin classics,
religious lessons, and history.320 In short, the universities of yore were
much closer continuations of the milieu of secondary schools.
The first cases tentatively equating schoolmasters and schoolchildren
with deans and undergraduates arose in the latter half of the 1800s.321 It is
generally agreed,322 however, that the leading judicial acceptance of in loco
prohibit all corporal punishment of children by their parents. . . . [I]t is clear to us that the
legislature did not intend to ban corporal punishment.”).
316. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985) (“[A] proper educational
environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of
rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult.”);
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (discussing and reaffirming
T.L.O.); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683–85 (1986) (permitting
school to forbid lewd speech because of the minority of the audience).
317. Morse, 551 U.S. at 414 (discussing Sheehan v. Sturges, 2 A. 841, 842 (1885)).
318. See SYRETT, supra note 20, at 15 (“These students were often quite young, many
entering [college] as young as ten years old and most graduating well before their twentieth
birthdays.”).
319. See id.
320. See id. at 16–20; Jackson, supra note 24, at 1139–40; Fowler, supra note 293, at
405.
321. See, e.g., People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton Coll., 40 Ill. 186 (Ill. 1866) (cited in
Jackson, supra note 24, at 1146 n.85 and Lee, supra note 293, at 68–69); North v. Bd. of
Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 27 N.E. 54 (Ill. 1891) (quoted in Lee, supra note 293, at 69).
322. E.g., Lee, supra note 293, at 69; Stamatakos, supra note 293, at 473–74; Jackson,
supra note 24, at 1146; Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 293, at 454.
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parentis for universities arrived in Gott v. Berea College, a 1913 decision
of the Kentucky Supreme Court.323 There, an aggrieved restaurateur
brought suit against the academy that had forbidden its students from
patronizing his establishment.324 The court was unmoved and took the side
of the college:
College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and
moral welfare and mental training of the pupils, and we are unable to see
why, to that end, they may not make any rule or regulation for the
government or betterment of their pupils that a parent could for the same
purpose. Whether the rules or regulations are wise or their aims worthy is a
matter left solely to the discretion of the authorities or parents as the case
may be, and, in the exercise of that discretion, the courts are not disposed to
interfere, unless the rules and aims are unlawful or against public policy.325

Berea College signaled that the ambit afforded to colleges would be as
broad as primary schools.326 All the same—and perhaps by necessity—the
emphasis in the context of higher education shifted to the privity of the
relationship between college and student, rather than the necessity of
corporal discipline to the education of youngsters—the concern that
animated the proliferation of in loco parentis in the primary school
posture.327
Other cases followed apace: courts around the nation were agreeing en
masse that university authorities enjoyed little to no restraint on their
discretion.328 In 1924, for example, the Florida Supreme Court adopted
virtually the same formulation as Berea College, quoting it with
approval.329 This was particularly true in gendered matters: in the same
year, the Maryland Supreme Court declared it would defer completely to

323. Gott v. Berea Coll., 161 S.W. 204 (Ky. 1913).
324. Id. at 205.
325. Id. at 206.
326. Id.; see also Jackson, supra note 24, at 1146–47.
327. E.g., Berea Coll., 161 S.W. at 205–06; John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 102 So. 637,
640–41 (Fla. 1924); see Fowler, supra note 293, at 413–14.
328. See, e.g., Woods v. Simpson, 126 A. 882 (Md. 1924); Barker v. Trs. of Bryn Mawr
Coll., 122 A. 220 (Pa. 1923); Booker v. Grand Rapids Med. Coll., 120 N.W. 589 (Mich.
1909); see also Jackson, supra note 24, at 47 n.95; see also supra notes 311–14 and
accompanying text.
329. Stetson Univ., 102 So. at 640 (“As to mental training, moral and physical discipline,
and welfare of the pupils, college authorities stand in loco parentis and in their discretion
may make any regulation for their government which a parent could make for the same
purpose, and so long as such regulations do not violate divine or human law, courts have no
more authority to interfere than they have to control the domestic discipline of a father in his
family.” (citing Gott v. Berea Coll., 101 S.W. 204 (Ky. 1913) (quoted in Lee, supra note
293, at 70)).
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faculties in matters of discipline and discretion, “especially in dealing with
girl students.”330 And in perhaps the most absurd example, the plaintiff in
1928’s Anthony v. Syracuse University found no recourse in the courts for
the stated cause for expulsion of not being “a typical Syracuse girl.”331 In
the Maryland case, the opprobrious behavior was the plaintiffs’ alleged
involvement in an accusation published in the school newspaper “that men
officials of the University were making objectionable suggestions to girl
students and otherwise exhibiting a wrong moral attitude toward them,”
foreshadowing the more specific set of parietal rights that colleges claimed
over relations between enrolled men and women.332
The relationship as fully realized inured to the mutual benefit of both
student and school: it “imposed a duty on the college to exercise control
over student conduct and, reciprocally, gave the students certain rights of
protection by the college.”333 Just as the inherent result of parents’ duty to
control a child is that parents may be liable for shirking their duty, so too
the doctrine of in loco parentis implied that universities could be held
responsible when their regulations failed to protect the charges whom they
had a duty to protect.334 For example, in Brigham Young University v.
330. Woods, 126 A. at 883.
331. Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 231 N.Y.S. 435, 437 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928).
332. Woods, 126 A. at 882.
333. Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1979); accord Baldwin v.
Zoradi, 176 Cal. Rptr. 809, 816–17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Univ. of Denver v. Whitlock, 744
P.2d 54, 59–60 (Colo. 1987) (en banc); Rabel v. Ill. Wesleyan Univ., 514 N.E.2d 552,
559–60 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Stamatakos, supra note 293, at 474 (“This latter notion of
physical welfare is critical to institutional tort liability: The exercise of legal authority is
inextricably bound with the obligations of legal duty, and Gott suggests that the in loco
parentis doctrine imposes a duty to protect the physical welfare of students. Thus, as
college administrators governed students with parental authority, courts began to recognize
a correlative legal duty to protect the students over which such authority was exercised.”).
Contra Lake, supra note 293, at 6 (calling the reciprocal view of in loco parentis as
imposing both duties and immunities “misguided and doctrinally incoherent”); Bickel &
Lake, supra note 293, at 271–73 (rejecting reciprocal view); see also Stamatakos, supra
note 293, at 482–84 (distinguishing theories underlying ostensible in loco parentis cases
finding collegiate liability).
334. See Edward J. Schoen & Joseph S. Falchek, You Haze, I Sue: A Fraternity Stew, 18
J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 127, 128 n.3 (2000) (describing in loco parentis as when “colleges
and universities were deemed to have a duty to protect the safety and welfare of their
students, as parents are expected to protect their children.”); Angela N. Marshlain,
Non-Hazing Injuries to Fraternity and Sorority Members: Should the Fraternal Association
be Required to Assume a Parental Role?, 5 APPALACHIAN L.J. 1, 13 (2006) (“When the
doctrine of in loco parentis was applied to universities, college administrators and
professors were required to assume a parental role thereby establishing a parent-child
relationship between the university and the students. This non-traditional parent-child
relationship gave rise to a legally recognized duty which when breached, amounted in
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Lillywhite,335 and in Hamburger v. Cornell University,336 the university was
held liable to students injured by chemical accidents upon a finding of
negligence in its duties, as exercised by its faculty.337 Although liability
arose from traditional analysis in tort, the underlying relationship giving
rise to the duty was ipso facto that of a student with a custodial
university.338
3.

The End of Traditional In Loco Parentis at Universities

With startling uniformity, authorities cite the single case Dixon v.
Alabama State Board of Education339 as “sounding the ‘death knell’” for
the doctrine of in loco parentis in 1961.340 To be sure, it was a case
involving obnoxious facts that cried out for judicial intervention: six black
students at Alabama State College had been summarily expelled for
participating in a civil rights demonstration.341 The court of appeals rightly
took umbrage, noting that the school was an arm of the state government,
and as such “due process requires notice and some opportunity for hearing
before a student at a tax-supported college is expelled for misconduct,”
including the right to notice of the charges, to a hearing, to present
witnesses on his behalf, and to be heard by the highest governing authority
of the school.342 Such detailed limitations on a college’s right of internal
discipline repudiated in loco parentis starkly, although sub silentio: the
opinion made no mention of the doctrine. Many more opinions followed
Dixon throughout the 1960s, resting on similar premises that state schools

imposing liability upon the university.” (footnotes omitted)); Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra
note 293, at 454; Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 139; Stamatakos, supra note 293, at 474.
335. Brigham Young Univ. v. Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 1941).
336. Hamburger v. Cornell Univ., 172 N.Y.S. 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1918).
337. See also Barr. v. Brooklyn Children’s Aid Soc., 190 N.Y.S. 296, 297 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1921) (“If it could be said under this complaint that the defendant is a college or university,
the defendant would be liable. This is clearly now the law.” (citing Hamburger, 172 N.Y.S.
5)). See Stamatakos, supra note 293, at 474, 474 n.17 (citing Brigham Young Univ., 118
F.2d 836, and Barr, 190 N.Y.S. 296, in the context of in loco parentis); Szablewicz &
Gibbs, supra note 293, at 455 (citing Brigham Young Univ. and Barr in the context of in
loco parentis).
338. See Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 293, at 455; supra note 333 and accompanying
text.
339. Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
930 (1961).
340. Fowler, supra note 293, at 408. See id. at 408 n.42; accord, e.g., Lake, supra note
293, at 9; Jackson, supra note 24, at 1149; Lee, supra note 293, at 70–71.
341. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 151–53.
342. Id. at 158.
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were not free to violate constitutional rights under the guise of internal
regulations.343
Dixon studiously limited its holding to public institutions of higher
education, declaring that relations between private schools and their
students were a matter of contract rather than due process.344 Such a model
dated back to the early decisions in which the private school’s code of
conduct and regulations were interpreted in a quasi-contractual fashion.345
Some initial decisions in the 1960s hewed to that line: St. John’s University
was allowed to expel students violating its Roman Catholic marital rules,346
and Columbia University was permitted to discipline students involved in
trespassory protests in the name of civil disobedience, which is the very
sort of the behavior Dixon had condemned.347 (In fairness, the relationship
between a university and its students is generally viewed as contractual to
this day.348)
That distinction between public and private did not long outlast the
1960s, however.349 In 1971, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution lowered the age of majority to eighteen, granting
university students the franchise en masse.350 The next year, Justice
William O. Douglas wrote that “[s]tudents—who, by reason of the
Twenty-sixth Amendment, become eligible to vote when 18 years of age—
343. E.g., Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Wisc. 1968) (due process);
Dickey v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (First Amendment);
Hammond v. S.C. State Coll., 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967) (First Amendment); Knight
v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) (due process).
344. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157; see Lake, supra note 293, at 10; Jackson, supra note 24, at
1153–54.
345. See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 293, at 411–13; see also Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni
Corp. v. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106, 116 (N.D.N.Y. 2007).
346. Carr v. St. John’s Univ., 187 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y. 1962).
347. Grossner v. Tr. of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
348. See, e.g., Yu v. Vassar Coll., 97 F. Supp. 3d 448, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“In New
York, the relationship between a university and its students is contractual in nature.”
(quoting Papaspiridakos v. Educ. Affiliates, Inc., No. 10 CV 5628(RJD)(JO), 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 129748, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2013), aff’d, 580 F. App’x 17 (2d Cir.
2014))); Vought v. Teachers Coll., Columbia Univ., 511 N.Y.S.2d 880, 881 (App. Div.
1987) (“When a student is admitted to a university, an implied contract arises between the
parties which states that if the student complies with the terms prescribed by the university,
he will obtain the degree he seeks.” (citing Carr v. St. John’s Univ., 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, 413
(App. Div.), aff’d, 12 N.Y.2d 802 (1962))).
349. See Lake, supra note 293, at 10 (“Following the spirit of the decisions regarding
public universities, courts began to decide that private colleges also owed their students
fundamental fairness. The courts achieved this through rules of contract interpretation and
read ‘the contract’ liberally in favor of student rights. . . .” (footnote omitted)).
350. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI; see Lee, supra note 293, at 76.
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are adults who are members of the college or university community.”351
Following this lead, in Bradshaw v. Rawlings,352 the Third Circuit
absolved the university of liability where a student injured in a drunken
driving accident claimed the university had been negligent in its duty to
protect its students in loco parentis.353 In so holding, the court expansively
rejected any notion that the college had responsibility for the conduct and
safety of its adult students:
As a result of these and other similar developments in our society, eighteen
year old students are now identified with an expansive bundle of individual
and social interests and possess discrete rights not held by college students
from decades past. There was a time when college administrators and
faculties assumed a role in loco parentis. Students were committed to their
charge because the students were considered minors. A special relationship
was created between college and student that imposed a duty on the college
to exercise control over student conduct and, reciprocally, gave the students
certain rights of protection by the college. The campus revolutions of the
late sixties and early seventies were a direct attack by the students on rigid
controls by the colleges and were an all-pervasive affirmative demand for
more student rights. In general, the students succeeded, peaceably and
otherwise, in acquiring a new status at colleges throughout the country.
These movements, taking place almost simultaneously with legislation and
case law lowering the age of majority, produced fundamental changes in
our society. A dramatic reapportionment of responsibilities and social
interests of general security took place. Regulation by the college of student
life on and off campus has become limited. Adult students now demand
and receive expanded rights of privacy in their college life including, for
example, liberal, if not unlimited, par[iet]al visiting hours.354 College
administrators no longer control the broad arena of general morals. At one
time, exercising their rights and duties in loco parentis, colleges were able
to impose strict regulations. But today students vigorously claim the right
to define and regulate their own lives. Especially have they demanded and
received satisfaction of their interest in self-assertion in both physical and
mental activities, and have vindicated what may be called the interest in
freedom of the individual will.355

As the nation entered the 1980s, colleges were no longer accountable
for the welfare of their students under in loco parentis: they could not

351. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 197 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
352. Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979).
353. Id. at 144.
354. The official reporter mistranscribed the esoteric term “parietal” as “partial.”
Subsequent opinions have recognized and corrected this scrivener’s error. E.g., Nero v.
Kan. State Univ., 861 P.2d 768, 773–74 (Kan. 1993).
355. Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 139–40 (footnotes omitted).
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assert all-encompassing parental authority over them, but neither were they
strictly accountable for protecting them from one another.356 To be sure,
there were still situations where colleges were held responsible, but these
were at least purportedly in spite of in loco parentis rather than because of
it.357
Justice Samuel Alito recently criticized in loco parentis in the context
of public education:
When public school authorities regulate student speech, they act as agents
of the State; they do not stand in the shoes of the students’ parents. It is a
dangerous fiction to pretend that parents simply delegate their authority—
including their authority to determine what their children may say and
hear—to public school authorities. It is even more dangerous to assume
that such a delegation of authority somehow strips public school authorities
of their status as agents of the State. Most parents, realistically, have no
choice but to send their children to a public school and little ability to influence what occurs in the school. It is therefore wrong to treat public
school officials, for purposes relevant to the First Amendment, as if they
were private, nongovernmental actors standing in loco parentis.358

Such arguments are not strictly apposite to non-compulsory
institutions such as private schools and tertiary education, but Justice
Alito’s rebuke highlights the speciousness of the legal fiction of parental
delegation.359 Even in private schools, parents hardly exercise control over
356. See Freeman v. Busch, 349 F.3d 582, 587 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[S]ince the late 1970s,
the general rule is that no special relationship exists between a college and its own students
because a college is not an insurer of the safety of its students.”); Lee, supra note 293, at 76
(“By the early 1970s, in loco parentis at universities was a relic of the past.”); Lake, supra
note 293, at 9–10; Stamatakos, supra note 293, at 474–76; e.g., Rabel v. Ill. Wesleyan
Univ., 514 N.E.2d 552, 560–61 (Ill. App. 1987) (“The university’s responsibility to its
students, as an institution of higher education, is to properly educate them. It would be
unrealistic to impose upon a university the additional role of custodian over its adult
students and to charge it with the responsibility for assuring their safety and the safety of
others.”); Eisman v. State, 511 N.E.2d 1128, 1136 (N.Y. 1987); Beach v. Univ. of Utah, 726
P.2d 413, 419 (Utah 1986) (“Fulfilling this charge would require the institution to babysit
each student, a task beyond the resources of any school. But more importantly, such
measures would be inconsistent with the nature of the relationship between the student and
the institution, for it would produce a repressive and inhospitable environment, largely
inconsistent with the objectives of a modern college education.”).
357. See infra Section III.C; Stamatakos, supra note 293, at 485–86 (discussing cases
cited in Tia Miyamoto, Liability of Colleges and Universities for Injuries During
Extracurricular Activities, 15 J.C. & U.L. 149 (1988)).
358. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).
359. See, e.g., Ralph D. Mawdsley, Random Drug Testing for Extracurricular Activities:
Has the Supreme Court Opened Pandora’s Box for Public Schools?, 2003 B.Y.U. EDUC. &
L.J. 587, 604 (“In loco parentis can be a convenient legal fiction for public schools, but
school officials may find that they have exceeded the limits of that fiction by implementing
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the curricula or parietal rules, and the notion that they are designating the
college as their legal proxy would surprise most if not all parents.360
Whatever force in loco parentis had in a more parochial era of education, it
should have little relevance now.361 Indeed, the Third Circuit lately
revisited its ruling in Bradshaw and emphatically reaffirmed the death of in
loco parentis.362
B. Paternalism Meets Fraternalism: In Loco Parentis and Greeks
Thus far the discussion has focused on the relationship of the
university and the student body as a whole. Moving from the general to the
specific, what then of the student who is also a fraternity member? If the
university was once thought to exercise quasi-parental supervision over its
charges, might not the same be said of the fraternity over its initiates or the
university over the fraternity? In short, perhaps the fraternal structure lends
particular strength to the arguments for applying a special relationship
between the student and the institutions—fraternal and academic alike—of
which he is a member.
1.

Arguments for a Particular Focus on Greek Society

After all, since their original days, many of the benefits ascribed to
fraternal living focused on the moderating force that upperclassmen exert

a policy that some parents neither favor nor would authorize for application to their
children.” (footnote omitted)).
360. See, e.g., id. Several scholars have discussed the demise of in loco parentis. See
Lee, supra note 293, at 72–76; Lake, supra note 293, at 9–10; Stamatakos, supra note 293,
at 474–76. But see Sweeton & Davis, supra 293, at 69–72, 71 (“In conclusion, it is clear
that in loco parentis is not a relic of the past, but rather a powerful force in the present. The
research conducted by Howe and Strauss (2003) illustrates that parents of today’s
traditionally-aged college student view themselves as equal partners in the education of their
children.”); Ward, supra note 34, at 225–26, 225 (“Too, parents often desire to have their
sons and daughters supervised by residence hall advisors and counselors. Evidence exists
that many parents think that the college is obligated to enforce the in loco parentis doctrine
vigorously.”).
361. See Lee, supra note 293, at 72–76; Lake, supra note 293, at 9–10; Stamatakos,
supra note 293, at 474–76. Contra Sweeton & Davis, supra 293 (arguing for continued
philosophical validity of the doctrine).
362. McCauley v. Univ. of V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Over thirty years
ago, in Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979), we recognized that ‘[w]hatever
may have been its responsibility in an earlier era, the authoritarian role of today’s college
administrations has been notably diluted.’ . . . The idea that public universities exercise strict
control over students via an in loco parentis relationship has decayed to the point of
irrelevance.” (alteration in original) (quoting Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138 (3d
Cir. 1979)))
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on unruly freshmen, acting very much in loco parentis: indeed, the
fraternity model was often described as a proxy family unit in early
literature.363 One apologia for Greek life declared forcefully in 1922:
A seventh ground on which fraternities may be explained and defended is
that they are, in most colleges, the sole substitute for the home and for
parental influence and restraint. In too many of our large universities
contact with professors is an exceedingly remote and impersonal thing. The
healthy, normal restraint of the ordinarily good home and of adult society is
wholly lacking. The fraternity supplies this lack as no other association in
college life is able to do. The fraternity house is the home; in the brothers
there assembled can be found the substitute for the family; and in the
upperclassmen, exercising their salutary restraint upon the underclassmen,
can be found the substitute for parental direction and counsel. This one
feature of the system justifies the system as it is now practiced.364

The very terminology of a fraternity or sorority, speaking of brothers
and sisters, reinforces the view that the society is something of a family
unit.365 Some courts have observed that brotherhood or sisterhood
bespeaks complete egalitarianism rather than hierarchy: the mutuality of
siblings rather than the authority of parent over child.366 Yet this is not
necessarily so; the ubiquitous fraternal practice of assigning new members
big brothers or big sisters, as the case may be, dispels any notion that
siblings are insusceptible of hierarchy.367 To maul the good work of
George Orwell, all fraternity members may be equal, but some members

363. E.g., HOWARD BEMENT & DOUGLAS BEMENT, THE STORY OF ZETA PSI 102–03 (2d
ed. 1932).
364. BEMENT & BEMENT, supra note 363, at 11 (emphasis added).
365. E.g., Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Frat. v. City Univ. of N.Y., 443 F. Supp.
2d 374, 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Plaintiffs explain that ‘[t]he single-sex, all male nature of the
Fraternity is essential to achieving and maintaining the congeniality, cohesion and stability
that enable it to function as a surrogate family and to meet social, emotional and cultural
needs of its members.’” (quoting the fraternity’s constitution)), rev’d, 502 F.3d 136 (2d Cir.
2007).
366. Alumni Ass’n v. Sullivan, 572 A.2d 1209, 1213 (Pa. 1990) (“By definition such
organizations are based upon fraternal, not paternal, relationships. . . . Fraternal
organizations are premised upon a fellowship of equals; it is not a relationship where one
group is superior to the other and may be held responsible for the conduct of the other.”).
367. See, e.g., Garofalo v. Lambda Chi Alpha Fraternity, 616 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Iowa
2000) (describing death occurring in connection with “a Big Brother/Little Brother
ceremony at the fraternity house”); see also Shaheen v. Yonts, 394 F. App’x 224, 229 (6th
Cir. 2010) (discussing Garofalo).
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are more equal than others.368 These senior members naturally gravitate
towards more authoritarian and thus parental roles.369
Lest such orotund conceits be thought restricted to historic authors, a
social scientist recently framed an entire anthropological study around the
metaphor of fraternity as a family of sorts. In The Lost Boys of Zeta Psi,
Professor Laurie Wilkie of the University of California at Berkeley tells the
story of a local chapter through the lens of the lost boys of J.M. Barrie’s
Peter Pan, unmoored from parental influences and subject only to their
own supervision.370 Such a conception reinforces the treatises that saw
elder members of the fraternity as the only sources of civilizing influence
on the younger, taking the place of absent parents.371 Under this view, the
fraternity must act in loco parentis almost by default, filling a void of
necessity.
Some authors have analogously felt that the unruly or sequestered
nature of fraternities necessitates particular supervision by the university.
Often these sentiments respond to the problem of fraternities’ hazing new
members, leading some colleges to “regulate them beyond recognition” in
an effort to curb such abuses.372 Indeed, university control is generally
greatest in the punctilious rules and restrictions imposed on fraternities’
recruitment and induction efforts.373 Similarly, modern colleges often
provide social engagement as well as an education, and they may feel it
incumbent to attempt to lessen raucous Animal-House-like carousing in an
effort to avoid injury to their students or liability.374 And, of course, courts
have long been deferential to collegiate judgments that fraternities may be
banned entirely to maintain academic focus and discipline and that students
violating such bans may be excluded from the college.375

368. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 112 (1946) (“All animals are equal, but some
animals are more equal than others.”).
369. BEMENT & BEMENT, supra note 363, at 11.
370. See generally WILKIE, supra note 35.
371. See id. at 23–26, 266–68.
372. Govan, supra note 7, at 698–99; see Hauser, supra note 270, at 435–37.
373. See Hauser, supra note 270, at 435–36; Sunshine, Fraternity as Franchise, supra
note 3, at 424–25 nn.325–27.
374. See, e.g., Kerri Mumford, Comment, Who Is Responsible for Fraternity Related
Injuries on American College Campuses?, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 737, 737–38
(2001).
375. People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton Coll., 40 Ill. 186 (Ill. 1866) (expulsion of student for
joining secret society); see cases discussed supra Section II.C.2.
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Judicial Rejection of In Loco Parentis Duties Anent Fraternities

Notwithstanding the noble conceit of the fraternity as foster family,
the law has not embraced this formally. Neither, by judicial lights, is the
modern fraternity member uniquely subject to parenting by the university
by virtue of his membership, despite the arguments for such heightened
scrutiny. As in the more generalized case, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
was generally seen as codifying a rejection of such in loco parentis
responsibility over college fraternity members.376 The common result is
that chapters and campuses alike escape purely vicarious liability for
injuries done to or by fraternity members in the mine run of factual
postures, even whilst losing their expansive onetime rights to regulate with
untrammeled authority.377
In one of the first such cases, the Indiana Court of Appeals rejected
arguments that the private Wabash University and fraternity should be
responsible for injuries caused by a drunken driving accident involving a
fraternity member, finding for the institutional defendants as a matter of
law.378 Citing Bradshaw with favor, the court held that “students and
fraternity members are not children. Save for very few legal exceptions,
they are adult citizens, ready, able, and willing to be responsible for their
own actions. Colleges and fraternities are not expected to assume a role
anything akin to in loco parentis or a general insurer.”379 Prudently, the
court did allow that there might arise a factual matrix in which a fraternity

376. See Timothy M. Burke, Fraternities and the Right to Privacy, FRATERNAL L., Sept.
1983, at 5 (“As recently as the late 1960s, colleges and universities were often said to stand
in loco parentis to their students. That is, the university administration took the place of the
student’s parents while the students were on the campus. Fraternities and their governing
bodies were often cast in the same light. . . . While the age of majority is not uniform and
often differs for the purpose of purchase or consumption of alcoholic beverages, college
students today should generally be viewed as adults, with both the rights and responsibilities
consistent with that status.”); Schoen & Falchek, supra note 334, at 128 n.3; see also
Marshlain, supra note 334, at 15–16 (noting reasons for abolishing in loco parentis apply
with equal effect to fraternities as universities).
377. Mumford, supra note 374, at 738 (“Until now, universities have successfully
avoided liability for fraternity-related injuries based on the ‘no duty’ rule, following the
demise of in loco parentis doctrine for universities. The ‘no duty’ rule states that the
relationship between the college and the student is simply one that provides education only.
The university is under no obligation or duty to control or govern the students’ behavior. . . .
Courts continually rely on this analysis of the relationship and the concern that holding the
college liable will return it to the strict liability standard of in loco parentis as a basis for
finding no liability.”).
378. Campbell v. Bd. of Trs. of Wabash Coll., 495 N.E.2d 227, 232–33 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986).
379. Id. at 232.
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could be held responsible under a general supervisory duty but that the
defunct in loco parentis doctrine would not suffice.380
The Colorado Supreme Court followed suit the next year in University
of Denver v. Whitlock,381 where a fraternity member sued the university for
a paralyzing injury suffered whilst using a trampoline on the Beta Theta Pi
fraternity’s premises, which was leased from the university.382 The trial
court directed a verdict for the university, but a divided panel reversed on
appeal, holding that the university had a duty to supervise the fraternity and
remove the dangerous plaything.383 Sitting en banc, the Colorado Supreme
Court reinstated the directed verdict,384 citing Bradshaw extensively, and
recognizing that although in loco parentis might once have been good law,
“in modern times there has evolved a gradual reapportionment of
responsibilities from the universities to the students, and a corresponding
departure from the in loco parentis relationship. Today, colleges and
universities are regarded as educational institutions rather than custodial
ones.”385
Tellingly, the court found that “fraternity and sorority
self-governance with minimal supervision appears to have been fostered by
the University.”386 Accordingly, there was no basis for in loco parentis
simply because the injury occurred in a fraternity context.387
Two early 1990s cases from Pennsylvania—one state and one
federal—serve as additional examples of the overwhelming trend.388 In the
state case, a student who was served alcohol at both a college dormitory
and fraternity party impleaded the university and fraternity when he was
sued for property damage caused by a fire later in the evening.389 The court
was unimpressed with the third-party defendants’ attenuated connection to
the fire and dismissed the impleader, commenting that the plaintiff “would
have us impose upon appellees a custodial relationship with University
students. Clearly, in modern times, it would be inappropriate to impose an

380. Id.
381. Univ. of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1987) (en banc); see also
Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 293, at 459–61 (tracing the lower court development).
382. Whitlock, 744 P.2d at 55–56.
383. Id. at 56; see Whitlock v. Univ. of Denver, 712 P.2d 1072 (Colo. App. 1985).
384. Whitlock, 744 P.2d at 62.
385. Id. at 59–60 (citation omitted).
386. Id. at 60.
387. Id. at 60–61.
388. Alumni Ass’n v. Sullivan, 572 A.2d 1209, 1213 (Pa. 1990); Booker v. Lehigh
Univ., 800 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1992); see Timothy M. Burke, Drawing the Line on
Liability, FRATERNAL L., Sept. 1990, at 3 (discussing Sullivan).
389. Sullivan, 572 A.2d at 1209–10.
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in loco parentis duty upon a university.”390 As in the previous cases, the
court laded praise on the “instructive” observations of the Bradshaw
ruling.391
The federal case concerned a sorority member claiming injury after
becoming intoxicated at multiple fraternity parties.392 The plaintiff
presented the novel argument that Lehigh University had contractually
taken on the powers of in loco parentis via a binding social policy
statement on alcohol and therefore assumed the responsibility for
monitoring fraternities and protecting the plaintiff from harm.393 The court
concluded that
even if Lehigh knowingly failed to prevent alcohol consumption, we could
not, nor would we, find a duty in loco parentis. If we were to hold that the
Social Policy created a duty to prevent Lehigh students from engaging in
underage drinking, we would be finding that Lehigh was potentially liable
in loco parentis, despite clear decisions from the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court that such cannot form the basis for imposing liability upon a
college.394

Yet again, Bradshaw was deemed “instructive” and quoted at
length.395 It is fair to say that Bradshaw has proven highly persuasive in
the Greek context;396 other courts are in accord, often including encomia to
Bradshaw as well as agreeing in the result.397 Commentators too widely
agree that in loco parentis is dead in cases involving fraternities.398 College
students, including fraternity members, have made a conscious trade: they
have reclaimed control of their lives from the pervasive control of the
university, but with that freedom comes legal responsibility for the
consequences of their own actions.399

390. Id. at 1213.
391. Id.
392. Booker, 800 F. Supp. at 235–36.
393. Id. at 236–37.
394. Id. at 240 (footnote omitted).
395. Id. at 238.
396. See, e.g., Marshlain, supra note 334, at 7–9 (describing relationship of Bradshaw to
fraternity cases).
397. E.g., Millard v. Osborne, 611 A.2d 715 (Pa. Super. 1992); Rabel v. Ill. Wesleyan
Univ., 514 N.E.2d 552, 558–59 (Ill. App. 1987).
398. See, e.g., Hauser, supra note 270, at 436; Mumford, supra note 374, at 738;
Rutledge, supra note 7, at 368.
399. See, e.g., Univ. of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 59–60 (Colo. 1987); see also
Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979).
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C. Blackstone’s Legacy: Parietal Rights and Responsibilities
Despite all this, the antitrust housing decisions in Yale College and
Colgate University, and to a lesser extent Hamilton College, rest on the
notion that colleges have a peculiar and particular right to direct the manner
and conditions of the lives of their students, right down the location where
their students will sleep.400 Such far-reaching control sounds identical to
the rights granted in the early-century in loco parentis cases, even though
such sweeping authority has ostensibly been a dead letter for nearly a half
century.401 What really differs between telling someone where she must
eat—as in the formative in loco parentis case Berea College—versus
where she must sleep?402 Indeed, Hamilton College dictated where its
students must eat as well!403 Given the supposedly comprehensive
rejection of in loco parentis, how is it still making appearances in modern
cases in the guise of parietal rights? Even having posed the question,
though, it cannot be entirely surprising that an ancient doctrine originally
described by the revered Blackstone should retain a certain staying
power.404
Scholarship has not been blind to a certain limited survival of parietal
rights and responsibilities;405 some authors have even applauded it as
acknowledging the growing view of college not as the start of adulthood
but as an extension of adolescence.406 Representative of this school of
400. See Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106, 117
(N.D.N.Y. 2007); Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 85 (2d. Cir.
2000); see also Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp.
2d 406, 413 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Any housing constraints experienced by students who have
chosen to enroll despite the residential policy flow from their implied contract with
Hamilton to comply with its rules, including the residential policy.”).
401. See supra Sections III.A, III.B.
402. See supra notes 323–27 and accompanying text.
403. Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 409.
404. Cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2796 (2014) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (“Moreover, history is not on the Court’s side. Recognition of the discrete
characters of ‘ecclesiastical and lay’ corporations dates back to Blackstone.” (citing
1WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *458 (1765))); Richard E. Myers II, Requiring a
Jury Vote of Censure to Convict, 88 N.C. L. REV. 137, 139 (2009) (“While there is no
question that the civil/criminal distinction is blurring at the margins, the distinction in our
common law tradition is as old as Blackstone, and retains strong support today.” (footnotes
omitted)).
405. See, e.g., Hauser, supra note 270, at 435–37; Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 293.
But see Stamatakos, supra note 293, at 472 (arguing new liability not fully akin to former
doctrine); Lake, supra note 293, at 5–6 (discrediting concerns of a perceived modern return
to in loco parentis).
406. See, e.g., Sweeton & Davis, supra note 293. Contra Marshlain, supra note 334, at
16.
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thought, Professor Eric Posner wrote that the call for more pervasive
university oversight “comes not from parents and administrators, but from
students themselves, who, apparently recognizing that their parents and
schools have not fully prepared them for independence, want universities to
resume their traditional role in loco parentis.”407 Some students seemingly
want to be protected from one another after all.408 (Indeed, such sentiments
have reached the pupils of Hamilton College as well.409) With rights,
however, come responsibilities, and several commentators have noted
modern cases that imposed liability for failing in duties to protect their
students on campus.410
The archetypal modern case finding a college liable for shirking its
supervisory duties is Furek v. University of Delaware.411 There, the
plaintiff was a pledge of the Sigma Phi Epsilon fraternity, and suffered
severe chemical burns when one of the brothers poured a lye-based oven
cleaner on him as part of a hazing ritual.412 The Delaware Supreme Court
acknowledged that the “concept of university control based on the doctrine
of in loco parentis has all but disappeared in the face of the realities of
modern college life”413 but then went on to harshly criticize Bradshaw,
Whitlock, and other cases rejecting university liability as lacking internal
logic or empirical support for their social policy.414 “Despite the rejection
of the in loco parentis doctrine, some courts continue to recognize the
uniqueness of the student-university relationship,” the court concluded,
adding itself to that number.415 How exactly this unique relationship
differed from that under in loco parentis went unexplained; the court

407. Eric Posner, Universities Are Right—and Within Their Rights—to Crack Down on
Speech and Behavior, SLATE MAG. (Feb. 12, 2015, 2:30 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2015/02/university_speech_codes_students_
are_children_who_must_be_protected.html [https://perma.cc/U5PN-PUSC].
408. Id.; Sweeton & Davis, supra note 293. But see Ward, supra note 34, at 217.
409. See, e.g., Emily Shire, Hamilton College Students Demand Free-Speech Ban and
Want White Faculty Out of Leadership, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 1, 2015, 8:59 PM), http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/12/01/hamilton-students-deliver-list-of-83-demandsto-college-president.html [https://perma.cc/5RVV-AEVR].
410. See, e.g., Rutledge, supra note 7, at 378–84; Mumford, supra note 374, at 745–51;
Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 293, at 457–61.
411. Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506 (Del. 1991); see Mumford, supra note 374, at
746 (“Although the doctrine of in loco parentis has been rejected, there are a few instances
where a court has found a special relationship between the university and its students. The
landmark case in this area is Furek v. University of Delaware. . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
412. Furek, 594 A.2d at 509–10.
413. Id. at 516–17 (citing Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1979).
414. Id. at 517–18.
415. Id. at 518.
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observed that “the modern university provides a setting in which every
aspect of student life is, to some degree, university guided.”416 Key to
finding liability, however, were the facts that the university had held itself
out as regulating fraternities, and that the injury took place on university
property, as the fraternity leased their land from the school.417
In Nero v. Kansas State University,418 on receiving a report of a sexual
assault in a residence hall, the university responded by moving the alleged
assailant to a different and all-male hall, but took no further action pending
resolution of criminal charges.419 Apparently owing to insufficient housing
during an intersession term, the plaintiff and the reported assailant were
assigned to the same coeducational dormitory, where she was allegedly
assaulted by him in the laundry room.420 The plaintiff brought suit against
the university.421 As in Furek, the Kansas Supreme Court ostensibly
recognized that the general rule of in loco parentis was defunct,422 holding
that “the university-student relationship does not in and of itself impose a
duty upon universities to protect students from the actions of fellow
students or third parties. The in loco parentis doctrine is outmoded and
inconsistent with the reality of contemporary collegiate life.”423
Yet Nero went on to reverse the summary judgment for the defendant,
opining that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the university was
responsible for the safety of those in its residence halls under premises
liability reasoning.424 The same result applied to a fraternity’s duty to
protect those within its housing in an analogous case, Delta Tau Delta,
Beta Alpha Chapter v. Johnson.425 There, the Indiana Supreme Court held
that the Greek homeowner could be held responsible when a party guest
was sexually assaulted at the chapterhouse, reasoning that the fraternity
was or should have been aware of the possibility of its invitees being
attacked, given a spate of previous incidents.426 Whether the university or
the fraternity is the proprietor of the residence, some courts have been

416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

Id. at 516.
Id. at 520–22.
Nero v. Kan. State Univ., 861 P.2d 768 (Kan. 1993).
Id. at 771.
Id. at 772.
Id.
Id. at 773–74.
Id. at 778 (emphasis added).
Id. at 780–81.
Delta Tau Delta, Beta Alpha Chapter v. Johnson, 712 N.E.2d 968 (Ind. 1999).
Id. at 971 & n.4, 973 & n.5.
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willing to hold them responsible for the general safety of those on campus
or the property.427
Overall, the continued philosophical viability of the parietal subset of
in loco parentis rights and responsibilities seems to derive from the unusual
control the university still imposes over residential circumstances,
intermixed with vaguely paternalistic concerns about sexual safety and
practices.428 Such reasoning carries odious echoes of the discretion
afforded colleges “in dealing with girl students” by early-century cases.429
Ruling on a case in which a woman alleged her college was negligent in
protecting her from sexual assault in its dormitory, a Massachusetts court
expounded at length on the general agreement that the university controls
and is thus responsible for residential rules and conditions:
This consensus stems from the nature of the situation. The
concentration of young people, especially young women, on a college
campus, creates favorable opportunities for criminal behavior. The threat of
criminal acts of third parties to resident students is self-evident, and the
college is the party which is in the position to take those steps which are
necessary to ensure the safety of its students. No student has the ability to
design and implement a security system, hire and supervise security guards,
provide security at the entrance of dormitories, install proper locks, and
establish a system of announcement for authorized visitors. Resident
students typically live in a particular room for a mere nine months and, as a
consequence, lack the incentive and capacity to take corrective measures.
College regulations may also bar the installation of additional locks or
chains. Some students may not have been exposed previously to living in a
residence hall or in a metropolitan area and may not be fully conscious of
the dangers that are present. Thus, the college must take the responsibility
on itself if anything is to be done at all.
Of course, changes in college life, reflected in the general decline of the
theory that a college stands in loco parentis to its students, arguably cut
against this view. The fact that a college need not police the morals of its
resident students, however, does not entitle it to abandon any effort to
ensure their physical safety. Parents, students, and the general community
427. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 894 P.2d 1366 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (discussed in
Lake, supra note 293, at 19); Peterson v. S.F. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 685 P.2d 1193 (Cal. 1984)
(discussed in Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 293, at 459); Relyea v. State, 385 So. 2d 1378
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (discussed in Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 293, at 458).
428. In all the cases cited in this section but for Furek—which implicated concerns about
hazing—the suit at issue involved a sexual attack.
429. Woods v. Simpson, 126 A. 882, 883 (Md. 1924); see supra notes 330–32; see also
Bickel & Lake, supra note 293, at 275 (criticizing view of in loco parentis as reciprocal
doctrine imposing both powers and duties on universities and arguing that “just because
students are empowered to speak on sensitive issues does not mean that female students
should expect less protection from physical assault by other students.”).
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still have a reasonable expectation, fostered in part by colleges themselves,
that reasonable care will be exercised to protect resident students from
foreseeable harm.430

Even with the general demise of in loco parentis, the subset of parietal
rights and responsibilities asserting control over residential arrangements
lingers under a strained sort of premises liability gloss.431 The bench is
disposed, in such cases, to recognize a special relationship between
universities and their students, even if judges are often unwilling to call this
relationship what it often seems to be: a narrowly circumscribed
continuation of in loco parentis doctrine.432 Put simply, if colleges can
control the students in their dormitories, they incur a concomitant duty.433
What this means for the antitrust analysis and fraternities generally will be
taken up in the final Part.
IV. STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: RUMINATIONS ON THE UNIVERSITY AND
FRATERNITY AS RIVALS
The decline and fall of in loco parentis indicates that the authority
colleges once wielded will no longer be recognized by the courts in the
mine run of cases.434 In all likelihood, increased reliance on the subset of
parietal rights reflects attempts by deans to consolidate what authority
remains in their hands.435 As courts have demonstrated their willingness to
accept even far-reaching parietal rules, colleges have naturally gravitated
towards exclusionary regulations under that rubric.436 This brand of
430. Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331, 335–36 (Mass. 1983) (footnotes and
citations omitted).
431. Writing in 1990, Theodore Stamatakos stridently rejected the notion promulgated
by some contemporaneous commentators that the in loco parentis doctrine was seeing a
“second coming.” See Stamatakos, supra note 293; see also Bickel & Lake, supra note 293.
This Article’s arguments are both supported by more recent developments in law, see supra
Part II, as well as limited to the persistence of in loco parentis reasoning in the parietal
context—that is, cases in which residential matters are at issue.
432. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 24, at 1151 (“However disguised and reformed, in
loco parentis survives.”); Schoen & Falchek, supra note 334, at 128 n.3 (“This may
represent a partial return to the in loco parentis doctrine . . . .”); Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra
note 293, at 461–65. But see Stamatakos, supra note 293; Bickel & Lake, supra note 293.
433. See, e.g., Mullins, 449 N.E.2d at 335–36 (cited supra text accompanying note 430).
434. See supra Sections III.A.3, III.B.2.
435. Ward, supra note 34, at 217 (“Moreover, some students have urged that the parietal
regulations are an attempt by the university authorities to ‘stand in the shoes of the father’
thereby interfering with the private lives of the student, notwithstanding the demise of the in
loco parentis doctrine.”).
436. See id.; Schonfeld, supra note 8 (detailing strategies of numerous colleges that have
moved to ban fraternities under parietal rules).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2017

63

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 2

122

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1

antagonism hearkens back to the earliest days of universities and
fraternities, when faculties fiercely opposed fraternities on the premise that
such societies split the atom of students’ loyalty.437 If these are the currents
that animate modern Greek-gown relations, the application of antitrust
precedents will provide useful guidance; there is little more archetypal to
competition law than long-standing competitors grappling for the loyalty
and patronage of consumers of their services.438
A. Twenty-First-Century Colleges and Competition
As has been noted, the modern university corporation is far different
from the cloistered academes of yesteryear.439 Yet as recently as 2000 in
Yale College, the Second Circuit introduced its thoughts rather jauntily:
We begin with the observation that if a parietal rule requiring some
students to reside in college or university housing runs afoul of the antitrust
laws, it has largely escaped the notice of the many colleges and universities
across the country that have had and continue to have those rules and the
notice of the millions of students who have attended those institutions in
the more than a century since the Sherman Act was enacted.440

If that is so, perhaps it is because by the time the Act came into force
in 1890, universities were making peace with their fraternities specifically
to accommodate students in Greek housing.441 As such, the universities of
the early twentieth century were not attempting to commit any antitrust
violations via their parietal rules; they were actively encouraging or at least
allowing the construction of fraternity housing to meet their swelling
needs.442 Some colleges still insisted students live in dormitories—unless
they were in fraternity housing;443 others required only underclassmen to

437. See supra Part I.
438. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter & Kathryn Graddy, Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a
Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby’s and Christie’s, 1 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 3 (2005); What an Art, ECONOMIST, Aug. 5, 2004 (“The irony is that, for a duopoly,
Christie’s and Sotheby’s were for the most part extremely competitive—particularly in
securing great collections for auction. When the two chairmen got together (at Sir
Anthony’s suggestion), a good deal of their first meeting was taken up with complaints that
one house was bad-mouthing the other. As one director points out, collusion was
unnecessary: ‘With a duopoly, it’s like two people selling tomatoes in a street. If one person
raises or lowers prices, the other one’s going to follow.’”).
439. See supra notes 318–20 and accompanying text.
440. Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2000).
441. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
442. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text.
443. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 34, at 219 (discussing Cooper v. Nix, 343 F. Supp. 1101
(W.D. La. 1972)); Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note 2, at 1027 n.257, 1039–40
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live on campus, allowing students the option of moving to a fraternity
thereafter.444 And, of course, many colleges did not resort to parietal rules
at all.445 The recrudescence of parietal rules as the modality for eradicating
unwanted fraternity competition has only arisen within the last half century
or so.446
Moreover, the Second Circuit’s observation also ignores sea changes
in relevant law between 1890 and the present. Most obvious is the
ostensible demise of in loco parentis as viable authority.447 For much of
the century since the Sherman Act was enacted, colleges enjoyed
essentially untrammeled authority over their students.448 As that doctrine
allowed colleges to expel students for any reason (or no reason at all),
particularly to protect its control over its charges, a school’s ousting
students in order to consolidate power over housing would be
unremarkable.449 Only beginning in the 1960s was despotic in loco
parentis authority withdrawn, which might reasonably be expected to
expose colleges to antitrust liability from which they had previously been
insulated.450
At the same time, nineteenth-century legislators and scholars likely
viewed colleges as ivory towers aloof from commerce.451 Only in the latter
half of the twentieth century has the Supreme Court made transparently

(discussing Pyeatte v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 102 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Okla.
1952)).
444. See, e.g., Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note 2, at 1026 nn.254–55, 992
n.4 (citing the University of Iowa as imposing parietal rules on only unmarried freshmen
and sophomores), 1041 (discussing Mollere v. Se. La. Coll., 304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. La.
1969)); Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59, 61 (2d
Cir. 1997).
445. See BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 21, at 121 (“In the latter half of the nineteenth
century, however, the dormitory system came under increasingly heavy fire; college after
college began to follow a policy of laissez faire in student housing, much the same as in the
case of the course of study.”).
446. See Schonfeld, supra note 8; Bauer, supra note 1.
447. See supra Sections III.A.3, III.B.2.
448. See supra Section III.A.2.
449. See, e.g., supra notes 327–31 and accompanying text.
450. See supra Section III.A.3.
451. See BOK, supra note 67, at 2–3 (“Before 1900, American universities were small
institutions just beginning to assume their modern form. Their principal function was to
provide a college education that emphasized mental discipline, religious piety, and strict
rules governing student behavior. Thus conceived, they remained quiet enclaves, having
little direct impact on the outside world and little traffic with the corporations, the banks,
and the legislative bodies that were busy transforming America into a modern industrial
state.”); Sun & Daniel, supra note 18, at 451–52.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2017

65

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 2

124

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1

clear that colleges may be the perpetrators of antitrust violations as well.452
To the extent colleges that thereafter moved to disadvantage fraternities
escaped antitrust scrutiny, the fault may lie with plaintiffs who neglected to
plead the novel theory.453 In the twenty-first century, it is entirely
reasonable to imagine that the sophisticated educational corporations that
compete for talent and research funds, manage billion-dollar endowments,
and market patents also wield commercial power.454
That federal courts continue to permit colleges the benefits of parietal
rights raises serious questions about the judiciary’s commitment to the
supposed consensus that colleges no longer have the right to control nor the
duty to protect their students.455 To hold as a matter of law, as did Colgate
University, that colleges have the prerogative to exercise “parietal rights” to
protect their students in a “quasi-parented environment” under a theory of
in loco parentis imports a dissonant doctrine from another era into modern
jurisprudence.456 At the very least, if Colgate intends to once again reduce
its students to legal incompetence, then it must be assigned the
responsibilities that go with that.457 On the other hand, some courts have
done just that in persevering with residential collegiate liability under
attenuated special relationship and premises liability theories, despite the
ostensible rejection of in loco parentis as such.458 If certain colleges are
engaged in paternalistic revanchism, at least the regression may prove
somewhat reciprocal.459 Nonetheless, such backsliding raises serious
questions of whether a regime resembling in loco parentis still makes good
public policy.460

452. See supra notes 66–73 and accompanying text.
453. E.g., supra Section II.B.1; cf. Manley, supra note 126, at 3 (“Many colleges and
many fraternities overlook the fact that they can commit offenses under the antitrust laws.”).
454. See Sun & Daniel, supra note 18, at 451–52; see also BOK, supra note 67, at 6–7
(noting obsolescence of the “ivory tower” model and transformation of universities
following World War II).
455. See supra Sections III.A.3, III.B.2.
456. Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106, 117
(N.D.N.Y. 2007).
457. See supra notes 333–37 and accompanying text; e.g., Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612
F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1979).
458. See supra Section III.C; e.g., Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 516–18 (Del.
1991).
459. See, e.g., supra notes 430–33 and accompanying text.
460. Compare, e.g., Marshlain, supra note 334, at 15–17 (arguing in loco parentis
doctrine fundamentally unfair), and Stamatakos, supra note 293, at 488–90 (arguing there
are dire consequences of implying that in loco parentis doctrine may once again be applied
to universities), with supra notes 405–09 (commentators opining favorably on the doctrine
returning to force).
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More functionally, viewing residential arrangements under the rubric
of educational prerogatives ignores the modern reality that dormitories are
a major economic sector: even considered alone, “Greek organizations own
and operate in excess of $3 billion in real estate, often located in prime
locations. These buildings house some 250,000 students. In short, chapter
housing is a big business . . . .”461 And if Brown University and Temple
University teach anything, it is that when a college faces students across the
bargaining table rather than the professorial lectern, the arguments for
applying antitrust protections are at their apogee.462 Rental arrangements
are logistically and logically distinct from education, as evidenced by
colleges without parietal requirements, and the fact that even colleges with
parietal regulations collect rent separately from tuition.463 So obvious was
this truism that the parties in American National Bank assumed as much.464
As The New York Times recently wrote:
Even when it awards full-tuition scholarships, the university makes
money—on dorm rooms and meal plans, books, football tickets, hoodies
and school spirit items like the giant Bama banner Ms. Zavilowitz and her
roommates bought for the blank wall in the suite’s common area. All told,
these extras and essentials brought in $173 million [to the University of
Alabama] last year—on top of $633 million in tuition and fees, up from
$135 million in 2005. “I hate very much to use this analogy, but it’s like
running a business,” [University of Alabama interim provost] Dr. Whitaker
said.465

Transparently financial motives would severely undermine
universities’ arguments that they are not acting as commercial competitors
but as educators in promulgating parietal rules.466 Like the defendant in

461. Sean P. Callan, The Chapter House Rules; How Corporate Structure Can Handcuff
a House Corporation, FRATERNAL L., Nov. 2012, at 3–4; see Sunshine, Fraternity as
Franchise, supra note 3, at 388–90. At Colgate, “revenues from real estate and business
operations” were roughly $17 million, compared to tuition and fees of $77 million. Manley,
supra note 202, at 1.
462. See, e.g., Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59,
64–65 (2d Cir. 1997).
463. Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d 406,
408 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
464. Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi. v. Bd. of Regents for Regency Univs., 607 F.
Supp. 845, 846 (N.D. Ill. 1984); see also Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 64–65 (noting that
American National Bank assumed college residential housing fell within the commercial
scope of the Sherman Act).
465. Laura Pappano, How the University of Alabama Became a National Player, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2016, at ED12.
466. See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text.
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Lycoming College, there are often difficult details to explain.467 Yale, for
example, was not forcing the objecting students to actually live in campus
dormitories, which could arguably have some educational aim.468 Rather,
the university was demanding that students pay rent for vacant rooms
assigned to them, even though the students were in fact living off-campus
due to their religious objections.469 It is hard to discern any pedagogical
objective in compelling students to recompense their host universities for
unusable residence hall space; the only plausible motivation is to secure
income from real estate holdings.470 As in American National Bank, courts
might reasonably fear that the university was engaging in chicanery for
pecuniary purposes.471 Yet it is also hard to fathom how Yale University,
with an endowment of $25.6 billion as of 2015, could seriously be
motivated by relatively picayune financial concerns.472
Universities seeking to eliminate fraternities argue cogently that they
are acting procompetitively to offer a distinct vision of an educational
experience, and students who do not care for it are free to enroll at schools
more friendly to Greek life.473 This Article has already discussed why this
may not be a fair assessment: prospective students can lack the
sophistication to evaluate the long-term impact of different housing options
in advance,474 and students and fraternities already at the university have
been locked in by switching costs if a new policy is promulgated.475
Moreover, colleges have not always offered a compelling explanation of
why students should not be able to opt out of allegedly compelling
residential offerings without forgoing their education—that is, why should

467. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text.
468. Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 16 F. Supp. 2d 183, 187 (D. Conn.
1998) (“Yale denied all of the plaintiffs’ exemption requests and required them to live on
campus in the coeducational residence halls. Yale charged the plaintiffs for the residence
hall fee, which the plaintiffs paid. The residence hall rooms remain vacant for the plaintiffs’
return. All of the plaintiffs have elected, however, to reside off campus in housing ‘that
provides . . . an appropriate environment in which to practice [their] faith.’” (alteration in
original)), aff’d, 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000).
469. Id.
470. See Ward, supra note 34, at 231–34; Mandatory Housing Requirements, supra note
2, at 995–96.
471. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
472. See Geraldine Fabrikant, Yale Endowment Returns 11.5%, Eclipsing Harvard’s
5.8%, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2015, at B2.
473. See, e.g., Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59,
61 (1997); Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106,
110-11 (N.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Yale Coll., 16 F. Supp. 2d at 196–97.
474. See supra notes 284–85 and accompanying text.
475. See supra notes 282–83 and accompanying text.
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the education and rental businesses be tied together at all?476 But the
colleges may be right withal; they unarguably have expertise and
experience in pedagogical matters and interest in providing a competitive
educational offering.477 The question is not one that has a clear answer a
priori.
But for that very reason, cases examining colleges’ attempts to
eliminate fraternities from the market should afford the searching look
dictated by the rule of reason to allow them to weigh proffered
procompetitive benefits to the college experience against the potential
anticompetitive aspects of banning an entire set of rival institutions.478
Such a standard accords with other cases in the educational context.479
Dispensing summarily with these suits as a matter of law, as occurred in
Hamilton College, Yale College, and Colgate University,480 neglects the
sensible precedent the Supreme Court set in Eastman Kodak.481 Even the
dissent there agreed at least that an examination under the rule of reason
was required.482 As the Court held:
In the end, of course, Kodak’s arguments may prove to be correct. It may
be that its parts, service, and equipment are components of one unified
market, or that the equipment market does discipline the aftermarkets so
that all three are priced competitively overall, or that any anticompetitive
effects of Kodak’s behavior are outweighed by its competitive effects. But
we cannot reach these conclusions as a matter of law on a record this

476. See supra notes 142–46, 200–03 and accompanying text; Mandatory Housing
Requirements, supra note 2, at 1014–22 (comparing and balancing the financial and
pedagogical rationales for parietal rules); cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc.,
504 U.S. 451, 485–86 (1992) (questioning legitimacy of tying arrangements). But see, e.g.,
Hamilton Coll., 106 F.3d at 61 (proponing reasons for tying housing to education).
477. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013) (approving
deference to university “experience and expertise” in academic value of diversity in
assembling its student body) (interpreting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)).
478. Contra Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 117–18.
479. E.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678–79 (3d Cir. 1993); NCAA v.
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
480. See Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 413–14; Hack v. President & Fellows of
Yale Coll., 16 F. Supp. 2d 183, 197 (D. Conn. 1998), aff’d, 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000);
Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 118.
481. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 485–86 (1992).
482. Id. at 502 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I would instead evaluate the aftermarket tie
alleged in this case under the rule of reason, where the tie’s actual anticompetitive effect in
the tied product market, together with its potential economic benefits, can be fully captured
in the analysis.” (citation omitted)). The dissent would have dismissed nonetheless because
plaintiff had procedurally forfeited such an evaluation. Id. at 502–03.
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sparse. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals denying
summary judgment is affirmed.483

It is difficult to countenance how a trio of district courts in the Second
Circuit dared go where the Supreme Court itself feared to tread.
Competition in residential aftermarkets at colleges deserves more searching
treatment than a handful of summary dispositions.484 This prescription
matters because juries no less than laws are vital to holding powerful
institutions to task.485 Counsel for the fraternity thus commented in
response to the district court dismissal in Colgate University: “There is no
question that Colgate monopolizes the number of beds available for people
who require them in Hamilton, N.Y. It is bad precedent and I think it is a
winnable case if it gets to a jury.”486
B. Fraternities Themselves as the Targets of Anticompetitive Action
Fraternities are ultimately a fractious family, unable to put up a
common front to rival their host university. Faced with campus
interdictions, most societies capitulated and surrendered their
chapterhouses, leaving only a few agitators to bring suit against
universities.487 This perpetuates a longer history of Greek-gown relations
during which monolithic schools and their long-term faculty have been able
to exert their will over the fraternities populated by transitory students.488
As Professor Wilkie at Berkeley observed, since their early history “the
rivalries between fraternities prevented them from colluding too much.
Recall that it took nearly a hundred years for Cal fraternities to join
together in an Interfraternity Council.”489 But it is just such bumptious
483. Id. at 485–86 (majority opinion).
484. Cf. Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59,
64–68 (1997).
485. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”); see
also Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xviii (2015)
(“Juries matter.”); see generally Peter H. Lousberg, On Keeping the Civil Jury Trial, 43
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 344 (1968).
486. Sara Stefanini, University System Is Not a Monopoly, LAW360 (June 29, 2007,
12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/28308/university-housing-system-is-not-amonopoly-judge [https://perma.cc/KK5X-M73C].
487. See Delta Kappa Epsilon Alumni Corp. v. Colgate Univ., 492 F. Supp. 2d 106, 108
(N.D.N.Y. 2007); York, supra note 201 (“All but one of the Greek-letter organizations
turned over their property by this summer.”); Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 407–08;
Hamilton Fraternities End Lawsuit vs. College, SYRACUSE HERALD AM., May 9, 1999, at
B1.
488. See supra Part I.
489. See WILKIE, supra note 35, at 256.
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rivalries that are typically viewed as promoting the competitive
environment that benefits consumers by providing optionality.490 For the
vast majority of the schools’ history, students were able to select amongst
very different living arrangements offered by very different landlords:
collegiate, fraternal, and private.491
The effect of market behavior on consumers is the generally accepted
metric of modern antitrust analysis.492 Yet such a perspective is not
inevitably exclusive; might not the Sherman Act also operate to protect
small businesses from their larger and more powerful rivals?493 By those
lights, the market for housing in many college towns exemplifies a
situation in which antitrust protections must be brought to bear: a single
entrenched and well-funded incumbent dominating and regulating the
market, with a throng of small and contentious competitors vying to split
the residuum of consumers.494 As can be seen from precedent both legal
and practical, absent vigorous application of antitrust law there is little to
stop the dominant player from eliminating its smaller rivals beyond its
voluntary forbearance.495 Indeed, by leveraging its greater financial
resources, a school can depend upon its singularity of purpose to
succeed,496 even when a substantial portion of the initial housing market is
initially controlled by fraternities.497
490. See Sun & Daniel, supra note 18, at 454–55; e.g., supra notes 28–32 and
accompanying text (rivalry amongst fraternities giving rise to more and superior residential
options).
491. See, e.g., Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 408 (“Until September 1995,
residential services were provided to Hamilton students by a number of fraternities and
private landlords in the Clinton, New York area, as well as by Hamilton.”).
492. See Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed
Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 312 (2006) (“Antitrust law is said to be a
‘consumer welfare prescription.’” (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343
(1979))).
493. See generally Sandeep Vaheesan, The Evolving Populisms of Antitrust, 93 NEB. L.
REV. 370 (2014).
494. See, e.g., Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d at 61 (1997) (noting college grossed $7 million
of residential revenue versus $1 million for fraternities).
495. See supra Sections II.B, II.C; e.g., Schonfeld, supra note 8.
496. See Hamilton Fraternities End Lawsuit vs. College, SYRACUSE HERALD AMERICAN,
May 9, 1999, at B1 (recording how all but one of the fraternities challenging Hamilton’s
action were eventually forced out of the case by mounting costs); Manley, supra note 15, at
1.
497. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 1, at 368 (noting that in 1960, “87% of Hamilton
students belonged to fraternities”); Schonfeld, supra note 8 (“If you have roughly a third of
the campus in all-male housing that can self-select, you’ve already set up a little bit of a
conflict on gender. Not having that seems to be an improvement from the start.” (quoting
Douglas Terp, Vice President for Administration at Colby College)).
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True, “[i]t is axiomatic that the antitrust laws were passed for ‘the
protection of competition, not competitors.’”498 But also axiomatic is that
“[c]ompetition requires competitors” or at least the potentiality of
competitors arising.499 If collegians are consumers,500 and colleges are
businesses,501 preventing the latter from monopolizing the provision of
residential services will promote robust competition in a circumscribed
market.502 Universities’ unified residential offerings may or may not be
superior to those offered by fraternities in a free market, but the essence of
the Sherman Act is in rejecting command-and-control economies in favor
of full-throated capitalism.503 Evidence suggests that students choose
fraternities when they offer better options at economical prices, as one
would expect in a healthy market.504 Conversely, colleges that rid
themselves of that competition can act like any other monopolist505:
After Hamilton College secured its monopoly power, charges for room and
board at Hamilton College increased $2,310, exceeding the charges of its

498. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224
(1993) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)); see Salop,
supra note 492, at 312 (“However, sometimes conduct that harms competitors benefits
consumers, implying that such conduct should be applauded as competition on the merits,
not attacked.”).
499. Cory S. Capps & David Dranove, Healthcare Provider and Payer Markets, in 1
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 63, 108 (Roger D. Blair
& D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015); Mitchell Schnurman, The Virgin Principle: Free Love Field
with More Choice, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.dallasnews.com/
business/business/2014/03/15/the-virgin-principle-free-love-field-with-more-choice [https://
perma.cc/UG3F-K2HB]; Allan Fels, Australia – A Regulator’s Perspective, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMPETITION LAW IN ASIA 379, 402 (Mark Williams ed., 2013)
(comparing views of small and large businesses); 151 CONG. REC. 6, 8670 (statement of
Rep. Oberstar, introducing the Railroad Competition and Improvement and Reauthorization
Act of 2005, May 4, 2005); Emmanuel Celler, What’s Wrong with “What is Wrong with the
Antitrust Laws,” 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 571, 578 (1963); Henry D. Ostberg, The Meaning of
the “Injury to Competition” Provision of the Robinson-Patman Act, 32 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
26, 28 (1957).
500. Cf. supra note 464 (discussing Hamilton College’s view of American National
Bank as confirming that rental of dormitory space to students is commercial).
501. See supra Section II.A.
502. See Bauer, supra note 1, at 371.
503. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951); Missouri v. Nat’l Org. for
Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301, 1302–06 (8th Cir. 1980); HYLTON, supra note 46, at 37–47;
Sun & Daniel, supra note 18, at 454–55.
504. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 1, at 350, 369, 380, 387–88; Sunshine, Fraternity as
Franchise, supra note 3, at 389 & n.86.
505. Manley, supra note 202, at 2 (“[A]fter Hamilton College got control of the
fraternity houses, the price of room and board went up on the campus and the quality of
room and board went down. This is typical behavior of a monopolist.”).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol39/iss1/2

72

Sunshine: Antitrust Precedent & Anti-Fraternity Sentiment: Revisiting Hamil

2017]

REVISITING HAMILTON COLLEGE

131

closest rival, Colgate University. At the same time, available living
facilities were reduced and students were crowded into spaces designed for
fewer people. Hamilton College students received lower quality services at
higher prices.506

In focusing on fraternities as targets of colleges’ conduct, a recent
development in Greek-gown relations at Hamilton is instructive. In the
spring of 2015, one of the surviving groups, Theta Delta Chi, received
sanctions for allegedly holding a party in an off-campus apartment at which
alcohol was provided to minors: it was forbidden from recruiting for over a
year and from hosting social events for over two years.507 The school’s
newspaper observed that no individual member of the fraternity was
punished or even brought before a hearing because the college could
produce no competent evidence supporting its allegations.508 However, the
fraternity itself was subject to the college’s plenipotentiary authority: it
enjoyed no evidentiary protections, due process, or official hearing to
present its case; punishment was imposed at a single dean’s sole
discretion.509 When the fraternity tried to clarify the nature of the

506. Manley, supra note 15, at 1.
507. Kevin Welsh, College Sanctions Theta Delta Chi Fraternity, SPECTATOR (May 7,
2015), http://students.hamilton.edu/spectator/news-2015/p/college-sanctions-theta-delta-chifraternity/view [https://perma.cc/4RAF-GC7D].
508. See id. (“The judicial process against the individuals never even reached a proper
hearing, though. Despite evidence of underage drinking at Tops, the Dean of Students office
failed to produce evidence connecting any specific house members with the alcohol.
Andrew Nachemson ‘15 faced charges from the Dean of Students Office and with three of
his housemates. He said, ‘[The Dean of Students Office] didn’t even have enough evidence
to hold a hearing, let alone convict us of any charges.’” (alteration in original)).
509. The article went on:
The lack of compelling evidence did not impede the judicial process facing
the Society, however. Whereas the Student Handbook outlines a clear judicial
process for students, no guidelines at Hamilton outline a set procedure for
sanctioning organizations. This lack of direction means that the Dean of Student’s
Office retains full discretion over the proceedings. Students facing punishment go
through a rigorous process involving either an administrative hearing or a Judicial
Board hearing, but Greek organizations simply face the decisions of the Dean of
Students Office. Dean Thompson described that in this case, “I met with the
president [of TDX] and we agreed underage students had been served . . . then [I]
decided on what the sanction would be.”
[Nachemson] explained that despite not being found responsible as an
individual, he believes his fraternity did not fare as well because “Dean Thompson
has absolutely no oversight in terms of doling out punishments to fraternities. She
was able to use evidence that wasn’t permissible in a Judicial Board hearing to
sanction the fraternity, and we were not permitted to counter that evidence with
our own.”
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sanctions, the dean offered the guidance that “she would know a social
event when she sees it.”510 “Facing undefined and all-encompassing
scrutiny going forward,” the newspaper concluded, the fraternity “decided
to disband rather than jeopardize the status of any of their members.”511
Such Kafkaesque adjudications illustrate how targeting fraternities
themselves is far easier than fraternity members, allowing further leverage
over the college’s residential rivals.512
CONCLUSION
Revisiting Hamilton College today, two decades after its confrontation
with fraternities, the sightseer will find it a lovely and well-appointed
campus,513 if not one wholly untroubled by contretemps.514 Unsurprisingly,
Bogardus supported this feeling of injustice and further explained his side of
TDX’s experience: “our ‘process’ as a fraternity consisted of a single 45-minute
meeting with Nancy Thompson during which we were unable to see any of the
evidence concerning their decision.” He said that Dean Thompson had already
arrived at a conclusion of responsibility and a sanction by the time the fraternity
met with her, and that they faced even further unclear scrutiny during the meeting.
Id. (first two alterations in original).
510. Id. The dean was presumably not making reference to Justice Potter Stewart’s
notorious definition of “hard core pornography”: “I shall not today attempt further to define
the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and
perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it.”
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
511. Welsh, supra note 507.
512. Compare supra note 509 with FRANZ KAFKA, In the Penal Colony, in SELECTED
SHORT STORIES OF FRANZ KAFKA 95, 103 (Willa & Edwin Muir trans., 1993) (“I have been
appointed judge in this penal colony. Despite my youth. For I was the former
Commandant’s assistant in all penal matters and know more about the apparatus than
anyone. My guiding principle is this: Guilt is never to be doubted. Other courts cannot
follow that principle, for they consist of several opinions and have higher courts to
scrutinize them. That is not the case here, or at least, it was not the case in the former
Commandant’s time.”); see also LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 37
(VolumeOne Publishing 1998) (1865) (“Fury said to a mouse, That he met in the house,
‘Let us both go to law: I will prosecute you.—Come, I’ll take no denial; We must have a
trial: For really this morning I’ve nothing to do.’ Said the mouse to the cur, ‘Such a trial,
dear sir, With no jury or judge, would be wasting our breath.’ ‘I’ll be judge, I’ll be jury,’
said cunning old Fury: ‘I’ll try the whole cause and condemn you to death.’”).
513. See Rachel Lieb, Keith McArtney & Evan Klondar, Opinion, Face Off: Does
Hamilton Allocate Its Money Wisely?, SPECTATOR (Feb. 10, 2011), http://students.
hamilton.edu/spectator/2-10-11/opinion/face-off [https://perma.cc/3YEB-FBPJ].
514. See, e.g., id.; Emily Shire, Hamilton College Students Demand Free-Speech Ban
and Want White Faculty Out of Leadership, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 1, 2015, 8:59 PM), http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/12/01/hamilton-students-deliver-list-of-83-demandsto-college-president.html [https://perma.cc/5RVV-AEVR].
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consolidating residential housing under the aegis of the college has not
proven a panacea to all ills.515 Hamilton has surely established a retreat for
the mind irrespective of means or upbringing, in the finest traditions of
modern academia.516 But has it done so at the expense of cherished
principles of fair play and competition? Further, Hamilton allowed
fraternities to continue on campus after neutralizing them as competitors,517
albeit subject to its indiscriminate oversight,518 but other universities have
not even been that kind to their captive societies.519 Should colleges be free
to abolish the options offered by Greek life entirely? Hamilton’s former
president, for one, has opined that the school erred in allowing fraternities
to remain at all, even in a sort of domesticated state, rather than extirpating
them root and branch.520 Recent policy changes at Harvard University, by
contrast, illustrate a more nuanced approach that at least partially
accommodates both collegiate and fraternal interests to provide students
qua consumers with some sort of choice.521
515. See, e.g., Editorial, Do We Have Traditions?, SPECTATOR (Dec. 10, 2015), http://
students.hamilton.edu/spectator/editorial-2015/p/do-we-have-traditions/view [https://perma.
cc/R3UP-MZ88] (“The culture of the College remains in transition since the upending of
fraternity culture with the banning of houses in the ‘90s. What the College administration
needs to realize is that, more than successful sports teams and late night events, the things
which break up the monotony of binge drinking and make our time here meaningful are
those collective cultures, those momentary rebellions against the normal order which make
traditions at a college. The Spectator does not advocate any activities which harm others, but
we believe that there is a value in bending the rules for the feeling of togetherness. We
believe that the College’s obsession with its own public image is harmful to the experience
of students here.”).
516. See, e.g., Sara Harberson, The Financial Aid Bowl Is the Ultimate High Stakes
Game, FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM (Dec. 29, 2015, 5:50 PM), http://www.startelegram.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/other-voices/article52146205.html [https://perma.
cc/2P2G-6JZD]; Jon Marcus, How One Top College Ended a Policy That Weeded Out Poor
POST
(Dec.
18,
2015,
10:24
AM),
http://
Students,
HUFFINGTON
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/how-one-top-college-ended-a-policy-that-weeded-out-poorstudents_us_5671dfcee4b0648fe302101e [https://perma.cc/C5UA-4TX3].
517. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
518. See supra notes 507–12 and accompanying text.
519. See, e.g., Schonfeld, supra note 8; supra note 256 and accompanying text.
520. Schonfeld, supra note 8 (“He pointed to Hamilton College, where he previously
served as president, as a school that botched its Greek reforms, opting to maintain frats and
sororities but ban their members from dining or living together.”).
521. In 2016, Harvard announced a policy under which members of single-sex fraternal
organizations would not be eligible for certain leadership positions that Harvard viewed as
representing the college, in order to avoid implicit endorsement of such organizations’
values—leaving students to make their choice as to priorities. Moreover, the new policy
was only to be applicable to students matriculating after its announcement, thus avoiding
some of the problems of “locked in” consumers, if not the fraternities themselves. See
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Yet even if some colleges are treating fraternities highhandedly,
perhaps there is room at the intersection of the uniquely American systems
of education and competition for some oases of curated experiences akin to
Hamilton College.522 The long existence—and persistence—of in loco
parentis doctrine in residential matters suggests colleges may still have
unique prerogatives in their tutelage of young adults.523 On the other hand,
fraternities themselves have enjoyed a lengthy and storied presence at
American universities that likewise militates for their continued
prerogatives.524 Whatever the outcome, the judicial system owes students,
fraternities, and colleges a more thorough airing of the arguments for and
against the future of fraternities in higher education than summary
dismissals, and antitrust precedent provides an apt framework in which to
do so.

C. Ramsey Fahs, In Historic Move, Harvard to Penalize Final Clubs, Greek Organizations,
HARVARD CRIMSON (May 6, 2016), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2016/5/6/collegesanctions-clubs-greeklife/ [https://perma.cc/3CAS-6EK7].
522. See DEREK BOK, HIGHER LEARNING 8–34 (1986) (placing competition at the heart of
the distinguishing elements of American universities); see also GEORGE FALLIS,
MULTIVERSITIES, IDEAS, AND DEMOCRACY 70 (2007) (“The American system of higher
education is felt to be unique because of its ‘decentralization, market competition, and
institutional pluralism . . . a product largely of historical happenstance and constitutional
pluralism.’” (citing BOK, supra note 522)).
523. See supra Part III.
524. See, e.g., SYRETT, supra note 20, at 3–4; Bauer, supra note 1, at 410–12.
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